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REPORT ON AVIATION SAFETY COMMITTEE ON
AERONAUTICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK* ** ***
SHEPHARD W. MELZER
PREFACE TO REPORT ON AVIATION SAFETY
T HE FOLLOWING REPORT on aviation safety was originally
prepared in June 1998 by the Committee on Aeronautics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and was pub-
lished in the July-August 1998 issue of the Record of the Associa-
tion. Since its original publication, there have been certain
developments in the area of aviation safety which illustrate both
the efforts to meet some of the concerns addressed in the re-
port, and suggest methods for improving such efforts.
On the positive side, the skies have become safer for passen-
gers on airplanes operated by U.S. carriers. The year 1998 was
marked as one of the safest times in the history of the airline
industry, with no passenger fatality reported in accidents involv-
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ing U.S. airlines' aircraft, with this streak of good fortune con-
tinuing through May of this year.' This excellent record was
accompanied by an impressive reduction in the number of acci-
dents involving aircraft operated by U.S. airlines, 2 while the fed-
eral government's Y2K preparation resulted in the first
successful test-flight using modified control equipment earlier
this year, ensuring safe passage into the next millennium.3
In addition, the federal government is putting into practice
measures to reduce aircraft accidents based on the findings of
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
which identified controlled-flight-into-terrain, loss of control,
uncontained engine failures, runway incursion, approach and
landing, and adverse weather conditions as major causes of acci-
dents.4 At the same time, the Congress is turning its attention to
aviation safety issues with proposals for increasing funding for
safety administration and for enacting stricter enforcement
measures. For example, a bill currently under consideration in
the House would double funding of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) in the next five years, 5 while several bills be-
ing debated in the Senate and the House would implement
long-waited measures against bogus aircraft parts, 6 provide pro-
tection for whistleblowers within the federal government,7 insti-
tute the Wide-Area-Augmentation-System, and establish an
aircraft repair and advisory panel.8
National Transportation Safety Board, Official Internet Site, ATSB Statistics
Show 1998 Was First Year with No Pasenger Death on U.S. Airlines, (Mar. 2, 1999)
<http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/1999/990302.html>.
2 Id.
3 Aviation International News//Online, FAA Passes Y2K Test of Air Traffic Sys-
tems, (visited May 20, 1999) <http://www.ainonline.com/may-faay2k_5.html>.
4 Federal Aviation Administration, New Safety Program Unveiled: Safer Skies-A Fo-
cused Agenda, (Apr. 14,1998) <http://www.faa.gov/apa/SaferSkies/chart.html>.
5 ABC News.com, House Committee OK's Boost for Aviation, (Mar. 11, 1999)
<http:abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/Passenger-rights990311 .html>.
6 Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, S 82 RS
(visited May 20, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl06:4:./temp/
-cl06apxFW3::>.
7 Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, S 648 IS
(visited May 20, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gove/cgi-bin/query/C?cl06:/temp/
~cl06sEO4U9>; see also Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th
Congress, H.R. 953 (visited May 20, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd-
query/z?d106:HR00953:@@@X>.
8 Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, S 82 RS,
(visited May 20, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl06:4:./temp/
-cl06apxFW3::>.
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On the other hand, accidents have not completely disap-
peared, as demonstrated by the runway accident involving
American Airlines Flight 1420 on June 1st of this year at Little
Rock, Arkansas, in which nine people died and several dozens
were injured.' The cause of the accident is not fully identified
yet pending the outcome of the current investigation. But, sev-
eral issues have been highlighted, such as possible mechanical
failure of spoilers at landing, bad weather and pilot fatigue,
among others, while the human deaths and injuries may have
been increased due to loose and unsecure seats inside the
aircraft.1 0
As the Arkansas accident demonstrates, certain mechanical
problems continue to haunt the aviation industry, such as the
continuing problem of rudders of B-737s even after modifica-
tions, 1 and the unsafe electrical wiring of B-727s despite efforts
to improve safety procedures.1 2 At the same time, as the recent
Congressional hearing on the investigation of the crash of the
TWA Flight 800 demonstrates, 13 there are problems with inter-
agency coordination among the various federal agencies in their
investigation of airplane accidents and implementation of im-
proved safety measures. This problem of coordination high-
lights the limitations in the federal government's ability to
identify the causes of accidents in a timely manner and, as a
result, to promptly remedy aircraft mechanical deficiencies to
prevent similar accidents. Such was the case with the delay in
the investigation of an emergency landing of a Metrojet B-737 in
February of this year, an investigation hampered by a flight re-
corder that did not have all the necessary information for deter-
mining the cause of the problem. This problem could have
been alleviated by the FAA four years ago when the National
Transportation Safety Board made its recommendation for up-
9 CNN, Deaths Confirmed After Airliner Skids Off Runway; 80 Injured, (June 2,
1999) <http://www.cnn.com/US/9906/O2/arkansas.crash.O1/html>.
10 Newsweek, We Shouldn't Be Landing, (June 14, 1999) <Newsweek.com/nw-
srv/issue/24-99a/printed/US/na/naOl24_2htm>.
11 ABC News, 737 Problem Persists, (Mar. 15, 1999) <http://
more.abcnews.go.com/sections/travel/DailyNews/rudderprobls.html>.
12 CNN, FAA Orders Emergency Inspection of Boeing 727s, (May 22, 1999) <http://
cnn.com/TRAVEL/NEWS/9905/22/faa.727/>.
13 Washington Post, FBI Probe of the 7WA Crash Criticized at Hill Hearing, (May
11, 1999) <http://search.washingtonpost.com/w... te/1999-05/11/0381-051199-
idx.html>.
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grading flight recorder capability on all B-737s, based on its in-
vestigation of earlier accidents. 4
There are other pressing issues that have not been addressed
yet either by the federal government or by the airline industry.
Security at airports continues to be problematic despite years of
warning by various federal agencies, 5 while the problem of air
traffic control sector workload and aging equipment have led to
several near mid-air accidents in the past year alone,16 the latest
example occurring in Philadelphia in May of this year.' 7 The
FAA turned its attention to the issue of pilot fatigue only re-
cently, after a union representing American Airline pilots urged
it to enforce existing regulations to provide adequate rest peri-
ods for pilots, in the wake of the Arkansas accident. 8 Handling
of hazardous materials remains an important area of safety con-
cern even though the investigations into the accidents involving
a FedEx DC-10 and a Value Jet DC-9 in 1996, point to the lack of
safety precautions as a probable cause of these accidents.' 9
Legal costs of each aircraft accident have been on the rise in
the past twelve month period. The ranks of plaintiffs in enor-
mously complex class action suits by victims of Swissair and the
TWA Flight 800 currently being litigated were recently joined by
a suit filed by victims of American Airlines Flight 1420, only a
week after the accident took place.2 0 Meanwhile, member coun-
tries of the International Civil Aviation Organization agreed to
14 Jim Hall, Chairman of NTSB, Statement Related to Flight Recorders Aboard
B-737 involved in Yesterday's Emergency Landing, National Transportation
Safety Board, (Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/1999/
990224.html>.
15 ABC News, Airport Security Lapses Found, (Mar. 11, 1999) <http://
more.abcnews.go.com/section.. .ilyNews/airportsecurity99031 1.html>.
16 See National Transportation Safety Board, Operational Error at Cleveland Air
Traffic Control Center, (Aug. 14, 1998) <http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/1998/
980814.html>.
17 CNN, Airport Radar System comes under Scrutiny, (May 23, 1999) <http://
www.cnn.com/US/9905/23/AM-AirportRadarFailure.ap/>; see also National
Transportation Safety Board, Official Internet Site, "LaGuardia Airport Near
Mid-Air Collision," (Jun. 5, 1998) <http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/980605.html>.
18 CNN, U.S. Puts Airlines on Notice Over Pilot Duty Times, (June 11, 1999) <http:/
/cnn.com/US/9906/11 /BC-AIRLINES-SAFETY.ret/>.
19 See National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Calls for More Aggressive Ac-
tion on Harzardous Materials in Air Cargo Shipments, (Jul. 21, 1998) <http://
ntsb.gov/pressrel/1998/980721.html>; National Transportation Safety Board,
Update - United Airlines and Metrojet B-737 Events, (Mar. 12, 1999)
<http:www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/1999/990312/html>.
20 CNN, Texas Crash Survivor Files Suit Against American Airlines, (June 12, 1999)
<http://cnn.com/US/9906/11/PlaneCrash-Lawsuit.ap/>.
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replace the 70 year-old Warsaw Convention limiting venues and
compensation to victims of aircraft accidents with a new interna-
tional treaty which introduces a no-fault compensation scheme
with a maximum of $135,000 in damages per passenger with the
possibility of recovery of additional damages in cases where the
airline is at fault.21 Although the new treaty does not affect U.S.
airlines in domestic cases because of the existing high liability
standards in the U.S., foreign carriers are more likely to be ex-
posed to higher damages and legal costs. 22
Given the many areas of aviation safety that are in need of
regulatory attention, it remains to be seen whether the current
trend towards safer air travel will influence reforms and reme-
dies in more problem areas while the legal and business conse-
quences to the airline industry of safety issues will continue to
remind the industry, government agencies and the flying public
of the high price that such issues bring.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important public issues today is the issue of
aviation safety. Newspapers, periodicals, and many news broad-
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casts inundate the public with alternating reports on increasing
safety or the absence thereof. Recently, the Aeronautics Com-
mittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
sponsored a public forum addressing various safety issues facing
the aviation industry. This report is an outgrowth of the forum,
and expands on many of the topics discussed there. The report
begins with an overview of the air travel industry, including the
applicable regulatory structure and a statistical analysis of the
safety hazards inherent in flying. Although air travel is among
the safest ways to travel and it continues to grow safer even as air
traffic increases, a number of problems persist. This report
deals with some of those problems. It considers the following
significant issues of aviation safety: (i) a common cause of air-
craft accidents-controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); (ii) the
importance of pilot training in reducing aircraft accidents; (iii)
the problem of language barriers between pilots and air traffic
controllers; (iv) the existing problems affecting the air traffic
management system and air traffic controllers, including the
Year 2000 issue; (v) bogus or unapproved aircraft parts; (vi) the
role of flight data recorders in aircraft accident investigation
and prevention; (vii) the transport of hazardous materials; (viii)
the recent Valujet disaster and some of the issues it brought into
the public spotlight; (ix) the problem of terrorism as it affects
airline travel; (x) explosive fuel/air mixtures and potential igni-
tion sources inside fuel tanks; and (xi) aging aircraft issues
brought into the forefront by the destruction of TWA Flight
800. The subject of aviation safety in general and the foregoing
safety issues in particular have important legal implications for
airlines, airline passengers and regulatory agencies both in
terms of responsibility for aviation safety measures and liability
for aircraft accidents. This report will explore these issues, re-
view current safety measures and liabilities, and make recom-
mendations for improvements in aviation safety.
II. OVERVIEW
A. THE AvIATION INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES
Air travel in the United States is an enormous industry. There
are more than 35,000 aircraft flights in this country each day,23
23 Interview with Robert Kelly, Director of Airports, and A] Graser, Assistant
Director of Airports, Port Authority, of New York and NewJersey (Jan. 16, 1998).
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with "an active... aviation fleet of more than 180,000 aircraft. 24
However, out of the 180,000 airplanes, only 5000 are airliners.25
The airlines operate out of approximately 600 airports, with
75% of their operations out of only 30 "hub" airports. In total,
though, there are 17,000 public use landing sites in the United
States. 26 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
reported that our air traffic control system "handles over 220
million flight operations annually. '2 7 The aviation sector cur-
rently contributes about 6% to the United States Gross Domestic
Product, and could contribute an additional $100 billion by the
year 2007.28 The industry as a whole supports 8 million jobs in
this country.29 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) esti-
mates that air travel will double over the next 20 years, with an
annual average growth rate of 4 - 6% per year. ° By the end of
this period, the FAA estimates that airlines around the world will
be transporting two and a half billion passengers per year.3 In
order to handle this increased activity, airlines will have to
double the existing fleet of aircraft, purchasing between 15,000
and 17,000 new planes by the year 2016.32 Of these, between
5000 and 7000 will be needed to replace aging aircraft; the re-
mainder-10,000 planes-will be required to handle the in-
crease in air traffic.3 Moreover, if the current accident rate
continues, coupled with expectations of increases in the number
of flights to take place around the world in the next century,
24 Jane F. Garvey, Remarks at the National Business Aviation Association An-
nual Meeting (Sept. 23, 1997) (transcript available at <http://www.dot.gov/af-
fairs/1997/92397jfg.htm>).
25 See id.
26 Telephone Interview with Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (Dec. 12, 1997).
27 National Transportation Safety Board Press Release (Jan. 23, 1996) (avail-
able at <http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/960123.htm>).
28 See David Hinson, Remarks at the FAA Annual Forecast Conference (Mar. 5,
1996) (transcript available at <http://www.faa.gov/apa/speeches/aoa/
forecast.htm>).
29 See David Hinson, Remarks at the Lehman Brothers Transportation Confer-
ence (Jan. 31, 1996) (transcript available at <http://www.faa.gov/apa/speeches/
aoa/lehpr.htm>).
30 See id; see also Honorable Jim Hall, Remarks before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Related Agencies (Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at
<http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/jh980211.htm>).
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tragic accidents may increase in frequency.34 We-have to bring
the aircraft accident rate down, and zero is the only acceptable
goal. 5
B. REGULATION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
The primary regulator of the aviation industry in the United
States is the FAA. The FAA's predecessor, the Federal Aviation
Agency, was created by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.36
When the Department of Transportation (DOT) was created in
1967, the Federal Aviation Agency was put under the DOT and
renamed the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA pro-
vides traffic control for aircraft flying over United States air-
space. In addition, and among other things, the FAA: (i)
oversees the safety of planes and airports; (ii) reviews the cre-
dentials and competency of pilots and mechanics; (iii) oversees
aviation security; (iv) conducts research programs related to
safety and security; (v) provides mandatory safety rules; and (vi)
conducts safety inspections. 7
The NTSB began operation on April 1, 1967. Until 1975, the
NTSB received funding from the Department of Transporta-
tion. The Independent Safety Board Act of 1975 severed all ties
between the NTSB and the DOT. The NTSB is now an in-
dependent federal agency charged with both "investigating
every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant
accidents in the other modes of transportation... and issuing
safety recommendations aimed at preventing future acci-
dents."38 Since 1967, the NTSB has investigated more than
100,000 aviation accidents, and has issued more than 10,000 rec-
ommendations concerning transportation safety. Although the
NTSB has no regulatory authority, its influence is such that over
80% of these recommendations have been adopted in some
form.39
34 Improving Airline Safety (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 11, 1997); [hereinaf-
ter Burnett] (featuring Jim Burnett, former NTSB Chairman, on Larry King
Live).
35 See id.
36 See Federal Aviation Administration, A Brief History of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http://www.faa.gov/history.htm>.
37 See Federal Aviation Administration, The Aviation Safety System (visited Feb. 9,
1999) <http://www.faa.gov/publicinfo.htm>. [hereinafter The Aviation Safety
System]
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C. How SAFE IS FLYING?
Statistically speaking, flying in an aircraft is extremely safe.
The NTSB has reported that the fatal accident rate for United
States airlines during 1996 was 0.026 per 100,000 aircraft
hours.40 At that rate, a passenger would have to fly twenty-four
hours a day for over 438 years before being involved in a fatal
crash.4 Put another way, in 1995, 175 people died in airline
accidents. Nearly five times as many people lost their lives in
boating, bicycle, and tricycle accidents.4 2 Nearly ten times as
many people died in swimming accidents, and 250 times more
people perished in motor vehicle accidents.43
Though, statistically speaking, aircraft flight is quite safe, air-
craft safety is an issue of great concern to the American people.
The explosion and crash of TWA Flight 800 provoked nation-
wide grief and horror on a scale unrivaled in recent history.44
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of such incidents is that it is
often demonstrated that they could have been avoided. As will
be discussed below, the industry is currently plagued by a
number of safety problems. Most of the major accidents in our
recent history can be traced to one of these problems. The tre-
mendous increase in air travel expected over the next twenty
years will put a greater strain on the various elements of the air-
craft safety system. It is therefore imperative that we address
these failings immediately.
D. POTENTIAL LIABILITy ISSUES
The failings in our current system present significant poten-
tial liability exposure for aircraft owners, aircraft operators, and
the federal government. If aircraft owners and/or aircraft oper-
ators fail to comply with existing safety guidelines, fail to imple-
ment recommended safety measures, or otherwise fail to
exercise due care, they may expose themselves to lawsuits from
passengers and their families. The government also is not im-
mune from legal repercussions; if government employees fail to
exercise due care in fulfilling their official non-discretionary du-
ties, the United States may face liability under the U.S. Torts
Claims Act, in which the Federal government waives its immu-




44 See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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nity to tort liability in the conduct of many of its functions.
Given the hundreds of lives that can be lost in a single aircraft
accident, the potential liability exposure is enormous.
III. CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN
A. PROBLEMS
CFIT is a significant accident categorization, cited as the
cause of most aircraft accidents.4" CFIT results when an air-
plane suddenly deviates from its normal flight pattern and flies
into terrain. A CFIT accident is one in which "an otherwise-ser-
viceable aircraft, under control of the crew, is flown (uninten-
tionally) into terrain, obstacles or water, with no prior awareness
on the part of the crew of the impending collision."46 "The Boe-
ing 757 Cali accident (CALl) was an example of CFIT"4 7 and,
most recently, the NTSB has been investigating the Boeing 747-
300 Guam accident as a possible CFIT-caused accident.4 8 CFIT
is responsible for "claiming the lives of 2,200 people between
1988 and 1995... in 37 accidents."49 Furthermore, 60% of the
commercial airline crashes worldwide caused by CFIT were com-
prised of aircraft flying non-precision approaches. 50
Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain is one of the greatest causes of
accidents resulting in fatalities in aviation.5 1 CFIT is not the re-
sult of aircraft mechanical failure, and rarely is it the result of
the failure of any governmental or regulatory agency. Rather,
CFIT is the result of human error-allowing a well-operating air-
craft to fly into terrain. Until recently, the Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS),52 which was required to be on board




48 See Hall, supra note 30.
49 Ladkin, supra note 45.
50 See Edward H. Philips, Safety of Nonprecision Approaches Examined, AVIATION
WK. AND SPACE TECH., Aug. 18, 1997, at 23. See also David Learmount, 1SF
Launches Final Assault on "Killer" CFIT Accident Rate, FLIGHT INT'L, Nov. 20, 1996, at
15 (quoting AlliedSignal's safety expert Dan Bateman as stating that "over the last
decade, for commercial jet operators worldwide, there have been an average of
four CFIT crashes a year, causing between 400 and 500 fatalities.").
51 See Ladkin, supra note 45.
52 See id. Developed by AlliedSignal Aerospace, traditional GPWS monitors an
aircraft's height above ground as determined by a radio altimeter. The GPWS
computer keeps track of the radio altimeter readings and other flight informa-
tion and sounds an audible warning if an undesirable trend develops. This in-
cludes situations such as: flight below specified descent angle during an
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
jet-powered passenger airliners by the FAA in 1976,51 and the
Traffic Collision Alert and Avoidance System (TCAS), 5 were
two of the most popular avionics devices available to help com-
bat CFIT. Because CFIT remained the most common cause of
aircraft accidents, and because both GPWS and TCAS were pro-
ducing false and nuisance alarms, the Enhanced Ground Prox-
imity Warning System (EGPWS) 55 and CFIT Checklist56 were
developed.
B. SOLUTIONS
Neither GPWS nor TCAS has been as effective as originally
desired:
Both GPWS and TCAS... have produced variable numbers of
false and nuisance alarms .... If a substantial fraction of the
warnings received are evaluated by pilots in hindsight as false or
unnecessary, they will not trust these systems, even if some of
these warnings are correct and could save the aircraft.57
EGPWS, by comparison, provides a full sixty second advance
warning of hazardous terrain whereas a conventional GPWS may
give pilots as little as ten seconds to take action.5" Additionally,
unlike the conventional GPWS, EGPWS gives an illuminated
panel display which is color-coded for surrounding terrain. 9 As
further evidence of the effectiveness of EGPWS, AlliedSignal
Aerospace won the Flight International Aerospace Industry
Award in the Air Transport Category in 1997 for its develop-
ment of EGPWS.60
instrument approach; excessive bank angle at low altitude; excessive descent rate;
insufficient terrain clearance; inadvertent descent after takeoff; and excessive clo-
sure rate to terrain.
53 See id.
54 See id. TCAS monitors an aircraft's position in relation to other aircraft and
sounds an audible alarm if an aircraft becomes dangerously close to another
aircraft.
55 See id. EGPWS, which won FAA certification in 1996, was developed by Al-
liedSignal Aerospace as an improvement on AlliedSignal's current GPWS.
EGPWS integrates the latest advances in navigation and terrain-database technol-
ogy, together with the traditional benefits of GPWS.
56 See id. The CFIT Checklist, developed by the Flight Safety Foundation, is a





6 See 1997 Aerospace Industry Awards Supplement, FLIGHT INT'L, June 18,
1997.
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As a result of the CALl accident, the NTSB urged the FAA to
"examine the effectiveness of the enhanced ground proximity
warning equipment and, if found effective, to require all trans-
port-category aircraft to be equipped with enhanced ground
proximity warning equipment that provides pilots with an early
warning of terrain."6 1
Subsequently, the FAA Human Factors Team has stated that:
Continued vulnerabilities to controlled-flight-into-terrain acci-
dents demonstrate the need for further improvement in this
area ... New approaches are needed to supplement or replace
the current ground proximity warning systems, such that earlier
indications and warnings of potential collisions with terrain are
provided and nuisance warnings are eliminated. A potential ap-
proach currently being proposed uses terrain databases in con-
junction with accurate position information (e.g., from the global
navigation satellite system), prediction algorithms for the air-
plane's future flight path, graphical terrain depiction on an elec-
tronic display, and suitable flight crew alerting... 62
The EGPWS works by comparing a digital database of the
world's terrain with the aircraft's location and altitude, to gener-
ate a map-like and color coded display of surrounding terrain. 63
It provides a sixty second warning, which is much longer than
the warning time provided by GPWS. 64 American Airlines and
United Airlines have ordered approximately 700 and over 400
EGPWS devices respectively.6 5
In addition to AlliedSignal's development of EGPWS to com-
bat CFIT accidents, the Flight Safety Foundation created a CFIT
Committee in 1993.66 The Flight Safety Foundation has led a
worldwide industry task force, including more than 120 organi-
zations, to reduce CFIT.67 As previously mentioned, the Flight
61 See Peter B. Ladkin, Computer-Related Incidents with Commercial Aircraft: The
American Airlines B757 Accident in Cali (May 5, 1998) <http://
www.rvs.unibielefeld.de/-ladkin/Incidents/FBW.html>.
62 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration
Human Factors Team, The Interfaces Between Flight crews and Modern Flight Deck Sys-
tems (June 18, 1996) <http://www.faa.gov/avr/afs/interfac.pdf>.
63 See Learmount, supra note 50.
64 See id.
65 See Paul Proctor, Major Airlines Embrace Enhanced GPWS, AviATION WK. AND
SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 1997, at 46.
66 See Ladkin, supra note 45.
67 See Stuart Matthews, Proposals for Improving Aviation Safety and Changing the
System, Remarks to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
International Conference on Aviation Safety and Security in the Twenty-first Cen-
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Safety Foundation developed a CFIT Checklist,6" a risk-assess-
ment checklist for pilots and operators.
Given that CFIT is one of the greatest causes of accidents re-
sulting in fatalities in commercial aviation and is largely the re-
sult of human error, if all pilots and operators are equipped
with EGPWS, use the CFIT Checklist, and are trained in CFIT




The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur-
ity has recommended that government and industry aviation
safety research should emphasize human factors and training.69
In fact, approximately 70% of the aircraft accidents which oc-
curred during the past forty years have been attributed to pilot
error.70 While the higher quality of pilot training has decreased
the number of accidents during this period even as air traffic
has increased, pilot training is still a serious concern.71 Jim Bur-
nett, former Chairman of the NTSB, has stated that the way to
further cut accident rates by up to 80% is through increased
pilot training. 72 Human factors continue to be the leading cause
tury (Jan. 13, 1997) (transcript available at <http://www.gwu.edu/-cms/
aviation>).
68 See Ladkin, supra note 45.
69 See Vice President Al Gore, THE WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION
SAFETY AND SECURITY FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON (Feb. 12, 1997) (tran-
script available at <http://www.aviationcommission.dot.gov/212fin~l.html>).
70 Interview with Joseph Vincent Montone, FAA Designated Examiner, and
Part 121 Check Airmen and Instructor, (Mar. 25, 1998). See also Hall, supra note
30 (stating that inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot-in-com-
mand, the failure of the non-flying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and
correct inappropriate control inputs, and the failure of Airborne Express to es-
tablish a formal, functional evaluation flight program were the probable causes
of the accident of a DC-8-63 which impacted mountainous terrain in the vicinity
of Narrows, Virginia, on December 22, 1996; and that failure of the pilots in the
King Air A90 to effectively monitor the common traffic advisory radio frequency
or to properly scan for traffic was the probable cause of the accident on Novem-
ber 19, 1996 involving United Express Flight 5925, a Beech 1900C, which col-
lided with a Beech King Air A90 at Quincy Municipal Airport near Quincy
Illinois).
71 See id.; see also Michael D. Fanfalone, Nat'l Pres. of Prof'1 Airways Sys. Special-
ists (PASS), Remarks before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Trans-
portation and Related Agencies (Feb. 3, 1998) (transcript available at 1998 WL
44744 (F.D.C.H.)).
72 See Burnett, supra note 34.
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of aircraft accidents, according to National Transportation
Safety Board Chairman, Jim Hall. 73 A Boeing analysis found
that flight crew errors were the most common cause of all world-
wide commercial jet accidents over the last ten years.7 ' This evi-
dences the need for better flight crew training.75 The needed
training in this area should focus on improving the collective
performance of the flight deck crew rather than the individual
flying skills and performance of its members.76
B. SOLUTIONS
A key objective in the aviation industry today is achieving a
zero accident rate. 77 One way of achieving this goal is the devel-
opment of a higher quality of captain and first officer training. 7
Crew Resource Management, programs in which pilots are
trained to improve communication techniques among them-
selves and to coordinate tasks in particular situations,7 9 and
CFIT training are two vehicles that help to educate crews in the
area of technical and non-technical training, both of which are
essential to the growth, development, and safety of a flight oper-
ation. 0 This training should be expanded throughout the in-
dustry.8' In addition, all pilots should be trained with a
"Captain's Mindset," a philosophy that conveys the message to
all first officers that they must think, act, and respond like a cap-
tain. 2 In flight operations throughout the world the co-pilot or
first officer is sometimes viewed as a second class citizen-a per-
73 See Interview with James Hall, Chairman of National Transportation Safety
Board (Feb. 11, 1998).
74 See Brent E. Dyer, Risk Management and Its Application to Air Carrier Safety, 62 J.
AIR L. & COM. 491, 501 (1996) (quoting Robert G. Knowles, Airline-Crash Preven-
tion Seen as Needed, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY - RISK & BENEFITS
MGMT., Nov. 28, 1994, at 21); see also Norman Y. Mineta, Chair, National Civil
Aviation Review Commission Report, Avoiding Aviation Gridlock and Reducing the
Accident Rate - A Consensus for Change (Dec. 11, 1997) (transcript available at
<http://www.faa.gov/ncarc/reports/pepele.htm>).
75 See Mineta, supra note 74.
76 See Montone, supra note 70.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Ladkin, supra note 45.
80 See id.
81 John H. Anderson, Remarks before the Subcommittee on Transportation,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (Feb. 12, 1998) (tran-
script available at 1998 WL 61442 (F.D.C.H.)).
82 Montone, supra note 47.
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ception which must be changed.83 Several aircraft accident case
studies have revealed that the co-pilot attempted to question the
captain on a procedure or clearance once or twice; however, as
a result of the co-pilot's junior status, the co-pilot was not able to
change the captain's mind and often was not even able to focus
the captain's attention on the problem.8 4 Thus, training co-pi-
lots to have a "Captain's Mindset" is imperative to achieving a
zero accident rate.85
When faced with a problem, a first officer trained with a "Cap-
tain's Mindset" will offer a solution to the captain instead of
looking to him or her for the answer.8 6 Such a first officer
would take responsibility for his or her aircraft, crew, and pas-
sengers, and would be trained to establish excellent habits in
order to be more of an asset in the cockpit as well as in the
cabin.87 A first officer with a "Captain's Mindset" should be
trained and checked according to Airline Transport Pilot stan-
dards, establishing a single-standard level of safety in the indus-
try.88 Such training will result in greater efficiency in pilot
training, a higher level of commitment from all flight depart-
ments, and greater pilot accountability, thus significantly in-
creasing aviation safety.8 9
It is difficult to put a price on the overall cost of an aircraft
accident or to estimate the true value of high quality pilot train-
ing. A single accident may shut down a company or, more tragi-
cally, result in significant loss of life. 9° Many individuals and/or
corporations may view pilot training as a financial liability until
an accident occurs which highlights the need to emphasize pilot
training.9' The entire aviation industry should be responsible
for educating corporate America on the value of high quality
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V. LANGUAGE BARRIERS
A. PROBLEMS
Lack of English language proficiency among air traffic con-
trollers and pilots has plagued the aviation industry around the
world for the past twenty years. 93 In fact, investigators have cited
the inability of air traffic controllers and pilots to speak and un-
derstand English (the industry's recognized common lan-
guage), as the cause of the following air disasters:
" In 1977, at Tenerife in the Canary Islands, heavy accents
and improper terminology among a Dutch KLM crew, an
American Pan Am crew and a Spanish air traffic controller
led to the worst aviation disaster in history, in which 583
passengers perished.
* In 1980, another Spanish air traffic controller at Tenerife
gave a holding pattern clearance to a Dan Air flight by say-
ing "turn to the left" when he should have said "turns to
the left", resulting in the aircraft making a single left turn
rather than making circles using left turns. The jet hit a
mountain killing 146 people.
* In 1990, Colombian Avianca pilots in a holding pattern
over Kennedy Airport told controllers that their 707 was
low on fuel. The crew should have stated that they had a
"fuel emergency," which would have given them immedi-
ate clearance to land. Instead, the crew declared a "mini-
mum fuel" condition. The plane ran out of fuel, crashing
and killing 72 people.
* In 1993, Chinese pilots flying a U.S.-made MD-80 were at-
tempting to land in northwest China. The pilots were baf-
fled by an audio alarm from the plane's ground proximity
warning system. A cockpit recorder picked up the pilot's
last words: "What does 'pull up' mean?"
* In 1995, an American Airlines jet crashed into a mountain
in Colombia after the captain instructed the autopilot to
steer towards the wrong beacon. A controller later stated
that he suspected from the pilot's communications that
the jet was in trouble, but that the controller's English was
not sufficient for him to understand and articulate the
problem.
93 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Language Gap Plays Role in Hundreds of Air Deaths,
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at B10; John Ritter, Cleared For Disaster: Poor Fluency in
English Means Mixed Signals, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1996, at IA.
787
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
On November 13, 1996, a Saudi Arabian airliner and a Ka-
zakhstan plane collided in mid-air near New Delhi, India.
While an investigation is still pending, early indications are
that the Kazak pilot may not have been sufficiently fluent
in English and was consequently unable to understand an
Indian controller giving instructions in English. 4
B. SOLUTIONS
English is, unofficially, the international language of avia-
tion." Every pilot who flies internationally must have command
of at least 500 English words.96 This standard is aimed at teach-
ing pilots the bare minimum that is required for understanding
basic aviation terminology.97 In addition, in the United States,
FAA regulations mandate that a foreign carrier wishing to oper-
ate in U.S. airspace must certify that its pilots can speak and
understand English well enough to communicate with
controllers.9"
It seems clear that the English standards currently in effect in
the United States and worldwide are dangerously insufficient.
In addition, the FAA has done very little to alleviate the prob-
lem. The FAA was supposed to urge the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) to support a spoken English test for
pilots and controllers.99 Instead, the FAA asked ICAO to coop-
erate with an industry group on a new glossary of international
aviation terms. l00 Some 180 nations have adopted these terms,
but they are nevertheless free to deviate from them. 1 In fact,
the FAA's mandatory wording differs from ICAO's in dozens of
instances. 102
What is needed, both in the U.S. and worldwide, is a
mandatory spoken English test for pilots and controllers. Such
a test should not place an unreasonably high burden on the avi-
ation industry in general. Many countries are voluntarily mov-
ing to an English-only aviation communication system. For
94 SeeJohn F. Burns, Indian and Kazak Officials Trade Accusations in Air Collision,
N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at All.
95 See Indian Air Disaster Raises Concerns About ATC Communications, CNS OUT-
LOOK, Nov. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8539760.
96 See id.
97 See id.




1 '2 See id.
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instance, this year all controllers and pilots in China are re-
quired to speak English to one another in all sectors of interna-
tional traffic."0 3  Furthermore, several higher learning
institutions, such as Embry-Riddle and the Center for Aerospace
Science at the University of North Dakota, have been teaching
English to foreign controllers for many years. This program
would be particularly useful for more widespread training
should a mandatory spoken English test become a reality."0 4
VI. THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM, AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS AND THE YEAR 2000 ISSUE
A. PROBLEMS - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM AND AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
The Air Traffic Control System (ATCS) in effect today is
largely the by-product of several catastrophic aviation accidents
that occurred during the late 1950s and early 1960s. 11 5 The two
most significant accidents occurred in 1956 and 1960.106 In
1956, a midair collision over the Grand Canyon led to the use of
primary, or search radar, to locate and to track the aircraft
monitored by controllers.10 7 In 1960, a midair collision over
New York City led to the use of secondary, or beacon radar, thus
giving air traffic controllers the individual identity and altitude
of each aircraft under their supervision. 108 Today, the overall
management of air traffic in the United States relies heavily on
the use of both primary and secondary radar, instantaneous
voice communications between pilots and air traffic controllers,
and ground-based automation at various ATMS facilities. 109
The FAA currently manages the nation's civilian ATCS." 0
Nearly 41% of the FAA's annual budget of $8.4 billion, and
three-quarters of its 49,000 employees, are involved with
ATCS.1 l This system encompasses airport control towers, which
103 See Matthew L. Wald, China Sends Controllers to U.S. To Improve English Profi-
ciency, THE N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at Al.
104 See id.
105 SeeJohn A. Scardina, et al. ATM: The Only Constant is Change, AEROSPACE AM,




-09 See Kelly, supra note 23.
110 See id.
III See Faye Bowers, FAA Looks For Ways to Free More Resources For Air Safety, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 1996, at 3. Cf Douglas B. Feaver, A New Route to Safety;
The Airline Industry Has Changed: So Must the FAA, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at CI
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guide and separate aircraft through landings, takeoffs, and taxi-
ing; and twenty air traffic management centers, which manage
the flow of air traffic between airports within the system. 1 2 The
system hardware, however, is chronically antiquated and in its
current form will be unable to safely accommodate the country's
steadily rising volume of air traffic. 1 3
Controllers are charged with a most important mandate -
they protect the lives of millions of air-passengers each day. Iron-
ically, they are forced to work with antiquated vacuum-tubed
computers, typically dating back to the 1960s and having only
one percent of the power of a modern desktop PC. 14 Of the
twenty-one Air Route Traffic Control Centers in the contiguous
United States, five operate IBM 9020E computers that are more
than thirty years old, and fifteen operate Raytheon 750 com-
puters that are approximately twenty-five years old. 1 5 Stress
rates among controllers continue to skyrocket, while mental
breakdown on the jobsite has been documented." 16 Overtime,
long hours, and extraordinary pressures have contributed to a
three-fold increase in near mid-air collisions over New York City
alone. 117
(putting the cost of ATMS at 70% of the FAA's budget or roughly $6.3 billion out
of a total budget of $9 billion).
112 See Scardina, supra note 105.
113 See, e.g., Jonathan Freeland, Collision Course: Deregulation Means World Avia-
tion is in for a Bumpy Ride, Crashes and Terror, MONTREAL GAZETrE, May 22, 1996, at
B3 (stating that ATCS is plagued by "dodgy equipment"); Editorial, Safety and
Airline Cost Cutting, TAMPA TRIB., July 10, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL
10876570 (stating that air traffic controllers complain of "antiquated, inadequate
radar equipment"); Darcy Frey, Something's Got to Give, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996,
at 42 (quoting an air traffic controller "If the FAA doesn't fix this goddamned
equipment, it's only a matter of time before there's a catastrophe."); Katherine T.
Beddingfield, et al., A Plier's Q&A on Safety, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 27,
1996, at 38, available in 1996 WL 7810768 (stating that air traffic control com-
puters are "antiquated").
114 See id.
115 See National Transportation Safety Board Press Release, Jan. 23, 1996.
116 See Darcy Frey, supra note 113 (recounting one controller's breakdown
when he lost ten jets on his radar screen over Newark during final approach and,
consequently, began ripping off his clothes and quivering on the floor).
117 See id.
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B. SOLUTIONS - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM AND AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
1. ATCS Privatization
Several industry-related groups have recently proposed priva-
tizing ATCS. 118 The obvious benefit of privatization would be to
transfer the costs currently borne by the government into pri-
vate hands.119 Proponents of privatization also claim that it
would make the skies safer. These groups reason that the FAA
frequently requires major capital expenditures to keep its radar
and communications equipment state of the art.'20 But as a gov-
ernment agency, the FAA has not been able to get the capital it
needs for ATCS quickly enough. 121 Consequently, ATCS equip-
ment remains chronically antiquated. 22 An ATCS corporation,
on the other hand, would be able to raise the required resources
by tapping into capital markets, thus insuring that it has state of
the art equipment.1 2
Additionally, proponents say a move towards ATCS privatiza-
tion would also relieve the overburdened FAA from all aspects
of air traffic control, except for oversight and regulation of the
private enterprise that assumes responsibility for the ATCS.
Such a new structure would enable a leaner governmental FAA
to devote substantially more of its resources exclusively to airline
118 See Feaver, supra note 111 (commenting that President Clinton proposed
the change two years ago but his administration has not pursued the matter in
spite of support from industry and FAA observers).
119 See Robert W. Pooleir., For Safer Skies, Let's Corporatize, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1994, at 18 (stating that privatization would save travelers and airlines time worth
up to $1.5 billion a year and save taxpayers $18 billion during the next decade).
120 See Bowers, supra note 111 (noting that ATCS is highly capital intensive and
that expensive equipment must be replaced every 15 years to keep pace with
technology).
121 See Poole, supra note 119 (stating that the government's costly and time-
consuming procurement regulations make modernizing ATCS difficult and virtu-
ally guarantee that the ATCS will remain one or two generations behind); see also
FAA Reform: It's Time to Split Promotion from Safety, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 28,
1996, at 26A, available in 1996 WL 2132800 (commenting that a House bill makes
good sense, since it would liberate the FAA from the Department of Transporta-
tion's cumbersome procurement procedures).
122 See id.
123 See Air Traffic Control: Clinton Urges Congress to Pass ATC Privatization Legisla-
tion, AIR SAFETY WK., May 15, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6704178 (quoting Presi-
dent Clinton as stating that the ATCS corporation "would quickly modernize the
nation's control towers, and would keep them up-to-date and properly staffed.
Even as traffic increases in years to come, the corporation would keep American
skies the safest in the world.").
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safety regulation. 124 Privatization would allow the FAA to "work
smarter" by using risk assessment to decide the carrier inspec-
tion targets and methods, manner, and degree of ATCS
monitoring. 1 25
Certain commentators believe that the FAA must update its
management techniques, improve its staff, and modernize its
culture in order to deal more effectively with its supervisory
functions and the problems which will result from the enormous
increase expected in air traffic in the coming years. They feel
that the FAA has been reluctant to abandon its "old boy net-
work" of former military and civil service personnel and must
make a concerted effort to hire a better educated and younger
group of professionals to fulfill its mandate. 126 Relieving the
FAA from the primary responsibility for air traffic control might
have the effect of enabling it to focus its attention on this and
other matters necessary to deal with current and future over-
sight and regulatory needs. In addition, private enterprise may
also be more amenable than the FAA to hiring air traffic con-
trollers who are graduates of the FAA-sponsored College Train-
ing Initiative. Even though the FAA sponsored this program, it
has not yet resulted in the hiring of significant numbers of these
graduates.
The first step in privatizing ATCS would be to reorganize the
FAA and create a new independent corporation.1 27 Next, sub-
stantially all ATCS-related FAA employees (roughly 40,000), all
FAA facilities equipment used to operate ATCS, and all ATC re-
sponsibilities held by the FAA (other than oversight and regula-
tion) would be transferred to this new corporation.1 28 During
the reorganization period, and until the company becomes fully
operational, all shares could be held by the United States. As
part of the reorganization, it is also possible that new ATCS com-
panies could be created to foster competition. 129 At the end of
any reorganization period, the shares would finally be sold to
124 See Bowers, supra note 111 (quoting an airline consultant as stating that
under ATCS privatization FAA "regulators would have more time in regulating
safety.").
125 See id.
126 Interview with Gary Kitley, Executive Director of the Council on Aviation
Accreditation (Feb. 19, 1998).
127 See Ronald D. Utt & Wendell Cox, How to Close Down the Department of Trans-
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the public, 3 ' or to one or more existing public or privately held
corporations. A portion of the shares might also be reserved for
purchase by firms and industries that would depend on the cor-
poration's services, such as major airlines or associations repre-
senting general aviation or passengers.13 1 Once the corporation
is established, it would operate on a self-supporting basis and
should have the same authority to borrow from capital markets
for major expenditures, modernization, and various other im-
provements as any other company.
32
Many countries have either already privatized their ATCS or
have legislation pending which would result in privatization.'3 3
For example, New Zealand has enjoyed success with the new
structure. Modernizing its ATCS for less than one half the cost
the government predicted, it persuaded private aircraft users to
pay user charges, reduced its operating costs, and returned
handsome profits.'
Those who oppose privatization (including some members of
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Aeronautics
Committee) make several persuasive arguments. Some worry
that a private corporation would actually hamper any effort to
improve safety, since such a corporation would be motivated
predominately by a desire for profits.' 35 Others contend that
public accountability and Congressional oversight would be
lost.'3 6 Labor groups are concerned about the potential labor-
management problems which might result from a privatized sys-




133 See Poole, supra note 119 (noting that, in 1992, Germany and South Africa
enacted privatization laws, Switzerland revised its privatization model along New
Zealand lines, Canada's airlines petitioned Transport Canada to convert to the
New Zealand model, and Britain went a step further by announcing that it would
sell its already corporatized ATCS to private investors).
134 See id.
135 See id. (quoting House Aviation Subcommittee ChairmanJames Oberstar: "I
do not believe that moving the ATC system further away from government con-
trol is the best way to ensure safety."); see a/soJoseph J. Trombino, Don't Privatize
Air-Traffic Control VIRGINIAN PILOT, Aug. 17, 1995, at A14 (stating that public
safety should not be in the hands of a corporation driven by profit).
136 See Pilots Group Against Air Traffic Control Corporation, Offers Congress Five-Point
Plan For FAA Reform, PR NEwSWIRE, Feb. 14, 1995 (questioning how key public
policy matters could be settled by a corporate board of directors which would
heavily influenced by the major airlines).
137 See id. (raising the possibility of a $2 billion pension liability due upon the
transfer of FAA employees to the private corporation).
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Association, posits that privatization is not a solution to this non-
problem. He believes that moving ATCS out of the government
into a private company creates no competitive advantage. The
private company will be a monopoly subject to union and large
corporate pressures, but without any countervailing public bene-
fit. Other opponents also maintain that already privatized air
traffic control agencies in other countries are so small by com-
parison to the FAA as to make comparison meaningless. Finally,
additional questions would arise in connection with liability or
responsibility for air traffic accidents. 3 '
2. Liberating the Federal Aviation Administration
Although privatization has not been acted upon in any mean-
ingful way in Washington, a bill recently passed by the House of
Representatives, while not privatizing ATCS, would combat the
funds procurement problem. The bill would largely free the
FAA from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its
myriad of procurement procedures, regulations, reviews, and
"bottomless pit of second guessers," giving air traffic controllers
faster access to the best technology and improving the efficiency
and profitability of U.S. airlines.1 39 Under the House Bill, the
Secretaries of Transportation and Defense would sit on the re-
formed FAA's board as nonvoting members. A Senate Bill, on
the other hand, would also combat the funds procurement
problem but would leave the FAA within the DOT. Former
Transportation Secretary Frederico PeZa supported such a bill
and threatened to ask President Clinton to veto any bill that
strips the FAA away from the DOT.140 This type of bill might
also enable the FAA to hire more of the better educated, re-
cently graduated College Training Initiative students as air traf-
fic controllers.
3. "Free-Flight"
Another proposal currently receiving a lot of attention,
known as "Free Flight," is endorsed by most industry groups in-
cluding the FAA.14 1 Free Flight, a joint initiative between the
138 See Boyer, supra note 26.
139 Feaver, supra note 111; see also FAA Reform: It's Time to Split Promotion from
Safety, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 28, 1996, at 26A available in 1996 WL
2132800.
140 See id.
141 Telephone Interview with Arlene Feldman, FAA Regional Administrator
(Mar. 24, 1998).
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FAA and the global aviation industry,"' is a satellite and com-
puter based navigation system."' Using this system, pilots,
rather than air traffic controllers, would be able to select their
own routes utilizing a Global Positioning System, a satellite net-
work that pinpoints an aircraft's position with great accuracy.144
The system is so advanced that pilots could even pick the routes
having the most favorable wind conditions and least traffic.
1 45
Free Flight is based on the principle of maintaining safe air-
craft separation. 146 The system defines two zones: a protected
zone and an alert zone.14 The size of each zone depends on
the aircraft's speed and performance characteristics as well as its
communication, navigation, and surveillance equipment.
1 48
The protected zone is the one closest to the aircraft. The pro-
tected zone of one aircraft can never meet the protected zone of
another.149 The alert zone is much larger than the protected
zone. Aircraft can move freely until two alert zones come into
contact.1 50 If two alert zones come into contact, a controller
would send course corrections or restrictions to ensure
separation. 1
51
The potential benefits of Free Flight are enormous. The sys-
tem would promote safety by allowing aircraft to travel with vir-
tually no assistance from overburdened air traffic controllers
and by providing more accurate information from satellites.
1 52
It is estimated that Free Flight will save domestic airlines as
much as $5 billion per year by the year 2010.153 Free Flight
could also shorten the duration of some flights by as much as
142 See id; see also Federal Aviation Administration, Free Flight: An Introduction,
(visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.faa.gov/asd> [hereinafter Free Right].










152 See id. Under Free Flight, air traffic controllers would be relegated to pro-
viding only minimal assistance when aircraft enter heavily trafficked airports and
cities.
153 See David Hinson, then-FAA Administrator, Remarks at The Coalition for
Clean Air Annual Luncheon, Los Angeles, California, (March 21, 1996) (tran-
script available at <http://www.faa.gov/apa/speeches/aoa/fso3air.htm>).
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20%.154 In fact, the FAA views Free Flight as a necessary concept
if the FAA is to handle the anticipated increase in air travel over
the next twenty years. 55 In order to implement Free Flight, the
FAA is currently evaluating and acquiring new technologies,
such as a standard terminal automation and replacement sys-
tem, a global positioning system, a wide area augmentation sys-
tem, a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, as well as
digital communications and dependent cooperative surveil-
lance. Additionally, it is evaluating decision support systems in-
cluding final approach spacing, enhanced traffic flow
management, conflict probe/resolution, and surface manage-
ment advisors.
Recently, the FAA developed Flight 2000 Path to Free Flight
(FLIGHT 2000).1516 FLIGHT 2000 is a microcosm of and precur-
sor to Free Flight. 157 FLIGHT 2000 will transfer the Free Flight
concept to a real operational setting and conduct a complete
operational system evaluation prior to NAS-wide develop-
ment. 1 58 At the center of FLIGHT 2000 is the integration of
information via digital communications, navigation satellites, au-
tomatic dependent surveillance broadcasts, weather processors,
cockpit displays, and air traffic control and flight planning tools
for the safe planning and efficient execution of all phases of
flight.159 Flight 2000's operational capabilities are scheduled to
begin in the year 2001 in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Ocean
airspace. 6 0
Although the potential benefits of Free Flight may be desira-
ble, such a free-flowing air traffic control system may compro-
mise safety. Particularly in congested air traffic areas such as the
New York metropolitan area, increased air traffic control and
separation - not decreased control and separation as proposed
through implementation of Free Flight - may be necessary to
ensure the safety of aircraft flight. Additionally, Free Flight can-
not be implemented immediately. Full implementation would
require new ground and air-based communications, navigation,
154 See id.
155 See David Hinson, then-FAA Administrator, Remarks at The Aero Club of
Southern California (March 22, 1996) (transcript available at <http://
www.ffa.gov/apa/speeches/aoa/aero322.htm>).
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and surveillance equipment, as well as new avionics and decision
support systems.1 61 Since the system hinges upon the introduc-
tion of sophisticated, high-tech satellite and computer tracking
technology, it is estimated that it will take at least ten years to
develop and implement and that it will cost billions of dollars.
162
C. PROBLEMS - THE YEAR 2000 ISSUE
At 12:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000, many computer systems
worldwide will malfunction or produce incorrect information
because of a simple date-change anomaly. 6 ' The Year 2000
(Y2K) Problem, as it is called, results from the way computer
systems store and manipulate dates.164 Dates are often used as
part of a computer-based system's algorithm or decision pro-
cess.165 For efficiency in storage space, most computer manufac-
turers and computer-program designers omitted the first two
digits for the year (i.e., the century) when they referred to dates
in computer programs.166 Therefore, when the date rolls over
from 1999 (99) to 2000 (00), many computer programs will fail
to recognize the change in the century and misread "00" (the
year 2000) as 1900 instead.'6 7
As the year 2000 approaches, the date rollover problems asso-
ciated with various computer systems become more apparent.
168
These problems include: 1) the malfunctioning of sort routines;
2) the reversal of logic decisions; 3) the inability to forecast
shelf-life items; 4) the inability of inventory systems to generate
correct stock level reports for reordering; 5) the malfunctioning
of commercial products; 6) the invasion of security access rules;
and 7) the inability to validate intelligence data properly.1 69
The types of systems that will be affected include mainframes,
client/servers, networks, workstations, telecommunications sys-
tems, radar processors, and communication processors.
1 70
Software that is potentially affected includes both application
161 See Free Flight, supra note 142.
162 See id.
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software and system software. 17' Databases and fields which
store two position year fields will also be affected. 172
Although the Y2K problem is not a difficult technical problem
to solve, it requires a major coordination effort throughout the
FAA due to the large number of computer systems, languages,
and platforms used by the FAA. 173 Many of the FAA's systems
are classified as Mission Critical, such as the majority of those
that comprise the National Aerospace System (NAS). 7 Several
Mission Critical systems are affected by the Y2K issue, and re-
quire renovation to become Year 2000 compliant. 175 Fortu-
nately, those repairs are well underway and many systems have
already been renovated and certified compliant. 176
D. SOLUTIONS-THE YEAR 2000 ISSUE
Safety is the single most important concern at the FAA. The
overall goal of the FAA Y2K Program Office (Y2K PO) is to in-
sure that the NAS operates safely through the Y2K and be-
yond.177 The FAA is now Y2K compliant, but it took several steps
to achieve this goal: 1) the establishment of a schedule that re-
quired all FAA systems (including the NAS) to be Y2K compliant
by June 30, 1999; 2) the development of Y2K contingency plans
for each FAA system to augment existing operational contin-
gency plans for the NAS detailing alternate courses of action in
the event of system outages due to Y2K; and 3) the development
of an agency level Y2K contingency plan. 78
In order to coordinate all Y2K compliance efforts throughout
the FAA, the Y2K PO developed four major goals: 1) to insure
that the NAS and other core FAA systems will operate reliably
through the Y2K and beyond; 2) to insure that all lines of busi-
ness across the FAA follow a consistent approach and adhere to
the project schedule; 3) to monitor the status of all FAA Y2K
efforts through the entire repair life cycle; and 4) to minimize
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One of the Y2K PO's first steps toward these goals was to es-
tablish Y2K Line of Business (LOB) Program Offices (LOB Y2K
PO) for each of the FAA's seven lines of business."1 0 Each LOB
Y2K PO is responsible for the Y2K repair activities associated
with all systems in its LOB."8 ' The FAA Y2K PO is responsible
for ensuring that LOB Y2K compliance efforts are carried out
effectively.1 2 More specifically, the FAA Y2K PO does the fol-
lowing: 1) establishes and maintains a structure, process, and
schedule for the Y2K repair efforts across the FAA; 2) monitors
and reports status for FAA Y2K activities; 3) helps coordinate
conversion of cross boundary information systems; 4) establishes
a method for ranking systems by critical and conversion priority;
5) minimizes and manages risk associated with the Y2K; 6) man-
ages resource allocation; 7) maintains clear lines of communica-
tion with all involved parties; and 8) facilitates the exchange of
information between LOB Y2K PO's, preventing duplication of
efforts. 8 Each LOB Y2K PO does the following: 1) oversees
Y2K repair efforts throughout the LOB; 2) maintains a manage-
ment structure conducive to this role; 3) insures that systems
and owners are adhering to the FAA Y2K repair process and
standards; 4) provides the LOB specific technical support to sys-
tems owners and renovators in the field; 5) mobilizes resources
within the LOB; 6) coordinates with appropriate managers in
the FAA Y2K PO regarding agency-wide standards; 7) works
closely with FAA Y2K PO to bring any necessary expertise to the
LOB; and 8) reports progress of Y2K repairs to the FAA Y2K
P0.18 4
The Y2K issue continues to be a concern. Given that the Year
2000 is less than one year away, in order to maintain safe air
travel we must insure that the necessary renovations made to key
FAA operations systems, including radar and communications
systems that control air traffic, are effective at maintaining such
systems as Y2K compliant. Otherwise, at 12:00 a.m. on January
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VII. AIRCRAFT PARTS: "BOGUS" OR "UNAPPROVED"
A. PROBLEMS
1. Background
Another major aviation safety problem involves the use of "bo-
gus" or "unapproved" parts.185 Everyone, including the FAA, ac-
knowledges that parts which have not been formally approved
by the FAA find their way into airplanes flying throughout the
United States.1"6 Parts are classified into two distinct categories
by the FAA. 8" The category "unapproved" parts refers to those
parts which are airworthy but simply lack the proper FAA
paperwork.'88 The other category, referred to as "bogus" parts,
includes counterfeit parts, parts which are inadequately refur-
bished, and parts which are simply not functional.'89 All experts
agree that the latter group of parts poses the greatest danger to
the flying public. 190
The FAA, however, appears to be reluctant to acknowledge
bogus parts as a cause of accidents. 191 Mary Schiavo, the outspo-
ken former Inspector General of the Transportation Depart-
ment, has asserted that the FAA pressured her and the NTSB to
replace the use of the term "bogus" parts with that of the less
ominous sounding "unapproved" parts terminology. 192 She has
also claimed that the FAA has reclassified accidents, actually
caused by bogus parts, as due to "unapproved" parts.'93 This
allegation was supported by an article in Business Week magazine,
which alleged a cover-up within the FAA designed to hide the
185 See Mineta, supra note 74; see also Willy Stern, Warning!, Bus. WK., June 10,
1996, at 84 [hereinafter Stern]; see also Safety and Airline Cost-Cutting, TAMPA TRIB.,
July 10, 1996 (stating that Valujet had purchased an inadequately refurbished
engine from a Turkish airline); see also Boyer, supra note 26.
186 See Stern, at 86 (quoting a head of quality control at a discount U.S.-based
airline as stating "I've got bad parts. We've all got 'em, but who's going to admit





191 See id. (stating that the FAA edited its database to reclassify accidents that
had been attributed to bogus parts and placed them in the unapproved
category).
192 See id. See also House Aviation Safety Hearing- Part 1, CNN Noon News (June
25,1996), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CNN File. Schiavo stated that an
FAA administrator told her to get her investigation "out of bogus parts" because
the already hurting airlines would only lose more money. Id.
193 See Stern, supra note 185, at 86.
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true scope of the problem. 94 The article noted that an internal
FAA report listed "bogus" parts as the cause of 166 accidents
between 1973 and 1993, a stark contrast to the FAA's public
claim that bogus parts had never caused a single accident.195
In testimony before the Senate, then-FAA Administrator
David Hinson said that unapproved parts were "a safety con-
cern", but that they did not pose a significant safety problem.
96
Hinson noted that "[t]here has never been a U.S. air carrier
accident in which an unapproved part has been determined to
be the cause.
197
2. The Scope of the Parts Industry
To understand the inherent complexity of the parts problem,
it is important to recognize that a single commercial aircraft typ-
ically contains millions of individual parts.1 98 Any attempt to reg-
ulate further the parts industry must be planned with the
understanding that there are literally billions upon billions of
parts worldwide. In a market so vast, it should come as no sur-
prise that bogus parts can make their way into virtually any han-
gar. Business Week, for example, asserts that "[e]very major
domestic air carrier" has unknowingly purchased bogus parts at
one time or another.1 99 The sheer size of the airline parts indus-
try has thus become a major impediment to change."' ° With
billions of parts in the market, it is impossible for either the indi-
vidual airlines or the FAA to verify the true lineage of any indi-
vidual part.2"' A refurbished and reconditioned part, properly
approved and ready to fly, is often indistinguishable on the
outside from another which had only the equivalent of a fresh
coat of paint.2 2
Yet another difficulty is the large number of parts distributors
and the international scope of the parts market. 20 3 One esti-
194 See id.
195 See id. at 87.
196 DOT Inspector General Says FAA Lax in Enforcing Parts Regulations, AIR SAFETY
WK., May 29, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter DOT Inspector].
197 Id.
198 See Stern, supra note 185, at 87. A Boeing 747, for example, has roughly 6
million parts. See id. The FAA estimates that roughly 26 million parts are changed
every year. See id. at 90, See also DOT Inspector, supra note 196, at 2.
199 Stern, supra note 185, at 89-90.
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mate places the number of parts dealers between 2,000 and
5,000.204 A recent incident exemplifies how the international
dimension of the market makes preventive measures difficult.
The cause of the June, 1995, fire in a Valujet plane at Hartsfield
International Airport in Atlanta was an engine which had been
improperly overhauled in Turkey.2 °5 The repair station in Tur-
key, lacking the requisite FAA approval, merely plated over a
cracked and corroded compressor disk and sold the part to
ValuJet.20 6 These "repairs" made the flaw undetectable to the
eye and obviously did nothing to alleviate a problem which even-
tually resulted in the evacuation of 57 passengers from the
plane.20
7
3. Current Parts Regulation
A brief explanation of the workings of the vast airline parts
market will help illustrate both the lack of regulation and some
of the difficulties that explain it. First, all manufacturers of air-
plane parts must be approved by the FAA, and parts made by
them must be accompanied by paperwork demonstrating that
they were made by an FAA-approved facility.20 But the parts are
then sold to unregulated dealers.20 9 It is at this stage that bogus
parts usually penetrate the market-the unregulated dealers sell
such bogus parts to regulated airlines whose mechanics install
them.210
Used and refurbished parts present even more problems.
They are supposed to be checked for strength and precision af-
ter repair, in strict accordance with FAA regulations.2 ' While
FAA documentation (a "yellow tag") should accompany these
parts to the aircraft before installation, there is no official seal,
nor is there any impediment to simply typing up fraudulent doc-
uments. 212 Parts dealers have the authority to simply type the
204 See id. at 88.
205 See id. at 84-85.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 85.
208 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.2-21.621 (1996) (detailing certification procedures for
aircraft products and parts).
209 See Stern, supra note 185, at 88.
210 See id.
211 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-43.17 (1996) (detailing procedures for maintenance,
rebuilding, and alteration of aircraft products and parts).
212 See Stern, supra note 185, at 88 ("Anyone with a word processor can cook up
fake paperwork, and yellow tags can be bought on the black market for $100 in
Miami, a center for the illegal-parts trade").
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appropriate information on the yellow tag without further in-
spection by the FAA.
B. SOLUTIONS
One possible solution to the parts problem would be for the
airlines to self-police the system. Given the dramatic effect that
even a single accident has on the business of a commercial air-
line, particularly a major national carrier, it would appear that
the self-interest of the airlines should be sufficient to motivate
them towards some form of self-policing. But, more often than
not, the airline that finally purchases the bogus part does so un-
knowingly; the fraud is usually perpetrated several steps before
the airline's purchase at the dealer level. 213
Another proposal, that appears to make even more sense and
is endorsed by the FAA is to require accreditation for dealers in
parts.21 4 Under this proposal, dealers must be accredited by the
FAA, and airlines that purchase parts from such registered deal-
ers would receive certain benefits. For example, the airlines
would receive the benefit of increased assurance that these parts
were not bogus or unapproved if the parts were purchased from
an FAA accredited dealer, which is accountable to the FAA.215
Airlines would also be prohibited from purchasing parts from
unaccredited dealers, and dealers would lose their accreditation
if they are found to have purchased parts from non-approved
sources. This approach would provide a system under which the
airlines would buy parts only from FAA-accredited dealers.
The airline self-regulation proposal, with respect to dealers, is
an appropriate interim measure; it is relatively low in cost and
would prompt airlines to seek out safe equipment sources. But,
in light of the serious safety concerns, the aircraft parts industry
requires even tighter controls. Another possible solution would
be to levy heavy fines for airlines found to be using bogus parts
or purchasing them from unaccredited dealers.
The toughest proposal, endorsed by the Office of Investiga-
tion (OIG) of the DOT, would have the FAA directly regulate
213 See id. at 88-90 ("Every major domestic air carrier-including American,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, USAir, and TWA- has in recent years
unknowingly bought unsafe or defective parts, according to court transcripts.")
(emphasis added).
214 See DOT Inspector, supra note 196, at 2.
215 See Sandra Sobieraj, FAA Toughens Rules Against Substandard Airplane Parts,
ASSOCIATED PREss, Oct. 13, 1995.
803
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
parts dealers.2 16 This approach would require a significant
number of FAA inspections initially (to certify each of the deal-
ers once the certification legislation was passed) and on an
ongoing basis (to insure that the dealers were following the
FAA's requirements and guidelines). But, former FAA Adminis-
trator David Hinson did not endorse the OIG's proposal, claim-
ing that it would be prohibitively expensive, among other
drawbacks.2 17 Alternatively, perhaps the purchase and/or sale
of bogus or unapproved parts should be made a crime, thus cre-
ating a criminal deterrent to dealers who purchase or sell such
parts.
Most recently however, the FAA issued an advisory circular to
provide information and guidance to the aviation community
for detecting suspected unapproved parts and reporting them to
the FAA. 218 This industry action is an important step towards
reducing and eventually eliminating the use of unapproved
parts, and thus increasing the safe operation of aircraft.
VIII. FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS: A CASE STUDY -
LOSS OF CONTROL OF 737s
A. PROBLEMS
It is a tribute to the efforts of the NTSB and to the FAA that
virtually every commercial aircraft accident is traced to a single
cause. It is this aggressive style of accident investigation which is
most likely responsible for the impressive safety record of the
U.S. aircraft industry. Nevertheless, several recent incidents in-
volving loss of control in 737s, the single most popular commer-
cial aircraft in the sky, have brought into question the ability of
the NTSB and the FAA to coordinate their efforts in solving a
widespread problem.219
216 See DOT Inspector, supra note 196, at 2.
217 See id.; see also Stern, supra note 185, at 90 (stating that the FAA thinks the
proposal would be too expensive and would not deter those dealers bent on
breaking the law).
218 See FAA Advisory Circular No. 21-29B, Detecting and Reporting Suspected Unap-
proved Parts, (Feb. 20, 1998) <http://www.faa.gov/abc/ac-chklst/ac2ll-97/AP3-
97.pdf>.
219 See, e.g., Byron Acohido, Grounded Eastwind Jet Is Back in Air- Investigators
Haven't Found Cause of 737's Four In-Flight Malfunctions, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3,
1996, at Al (describing malfunctions which could have led to the third 737 un-
solvable crash on U.S. soil this decade). On March 3,1991, a United Airlines 737
took a sudden nose dive and crashed in Colorado Springs, and on September 8,
1994, a USAir 737 also crashed, in similar fashion, in Pittsburgh. The causes of
these crashes have never been determined. Id.
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B. SOLUTIONS
A major problem that the FAA and the NTSB have recently
addressed is the antiquated flight data recorders on many air-
craft currently in use, including 737s.22° In addition to inter-
views of the flight crew, flight data recorders enable the FAA to
explain problems that develop during flight.221 But, the flight
data recorders on many of the 737s now in operation provide
only inefficient readings on such parameters as time, pressure,
altitude, air speed, acceleration, pitch, and thrust power.22 In-
formation obtained from modern flight data recorders, which
record information such as the operational status of aircraft
electrical and hydraulic systems, might increase the ability of the
NTSB to determine the precise cause of an aircraft accident,
thereby putting aircraft operators on notice of potential safety
concerns. The lack of information from flight recorders has
been identified as a reason why the cause of many of the recent
loss of control episodes has not been found.223
The corrective actions taken by the NTSB and the FAA call
into question the ability of these agencies to handle safety issues
collectively in a timely manner.224 In February 1995, the NTSB
recommended that the FAA order all U.S. airlines to install
state-of-the-art flight data recorders on all 737s by the end of
1995.225 Although this goal was probably attainable, the warning
220 See Hall, supra note 30; see also FAA Issues Compromise Proposal on Flight Data
Recorders, AIR SAFETY WK., July 15, 1996 [hereinafter FAA Issues Compromise].
221 See Hall, supra note 30.
222 See id.; see also Acohido, supra note 219 (stating that the recorders used on
most 737s track only engine speed and general direction of travel).
223 See Hall, supra note 30, (stating that the investigation as to the cause of the
crash on September 8, 1994, of USAir Flight 427 near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
killing all 132 people on board, has been hampered by the few parameters re-
corded by the airplane's flight data recorder); see also Acohido, supra note 219;
FAA Claifying Certification Policy on Flight Control Jams, AIR SAFEry WK.,Jan. 6, 1997.
It should be noted that the FAA recently issued an airworthiness directive (AD)
requiring operators of the 737 to add procedures to their flight manuals which
would enable pilots to maintain control of their aircraft during uncommanded
yaw or roll conditions. This January 2, 1997 AD follows a discovery that ajam of
the rudder power control unit could result in uncommanded rudder motion.
The FAA has also ordered an immediate and continuing inspection of the 737.
224 See id.; see also FAA Issues Compromise, supra note 220.
225 See Acohido, supra note 219. It should be noted that the NTSB is an in-
dependent agency charged with investigating accidents in all modes of transpor-
tation. The NTSB cannot force other agencies, like the FAA, to accept any of its
recommendations. See also J. Lynn Lunsford, FAA ReJected 532 Proposals for Air
Safety: Agency Says It Has Given Most of NTSB's Ideas Close Attention, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, June 30, 1996, at IA. Since its inception, over thirty years ago, the
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was not heeded.226 In June 1996, after an Eastwind 737 was
grounded for a loss of control problem, NTSB chairman Jim
Hall sent a letter to the FAA which compared this loss of control
with other accidents and accused Hinson of failing to heed the
February 1995 recommendations.227 On July 9, 1996, rather
than going along with the NTSB's proposal for an immediate
retrofit of the 737s, the FAA finally issued a proposal that would
give airlines four years to retrofit their fleets, 737s included.228
According to the NTSB, such a time frame is too long.229
This series of events raised many troubling questions. Most
importantly, why can not the NTSB and the FAA work together
to remedy important safety issues, such as losses of control, as
quickly and efficiently as possible? It is difficult to understand
why interagency differences should delay information of impor-
tant safety measures, while 737s take mysterious nose dives and
their flight data recorders offer no insight into the cause.230
Most recently, however, the Federal Aviation Administration
codified "a final rule requiring that certain airplanes be
equipped to accommodate additional digital flight data re-
corder (DFDR) parameters". 231' This final rule follows both a
series of safety recommendations issued by the NTSB, as well as
the FAA's decision to revise the digital flight data recorder rules
to upgrade recorder capabilities in most transport airplanes.
These revisions will require the collection of additional informa-
tion for a more thorough accident or incident investigation, so
that the aviation industry will be able to predict certain trends
government-operated FAA has rejected 532 recommendations of the independ-
ent NTSB. Id. FAA officials explain that the agency has adopted or is currently
reviewing almost 83% of the 3,300 recommendations that the NTSB has
presented since its inception. Id. Dave Thomas, director of the FAA's Office of
Accident Investigations, asserts: "Out of the 3,300 recommendations that the
safety board has made, there are less than 10 that the FAA has flatly re-
jected .... In every other case, we have done something that for whatever reason
did not meet the expectations of the NTSB." Id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See FAA Issues Compromise, supra note 220.
229 See Interview with James Hall, supra note 73.
230 See FAA Issues Compromise, supra note 220 (citing a former NTSB investiga-
tor's statement that the FAA has no excuse for not requiring the nation's fleet to
be retrofitted with state of the art flight recorders, rather than with the limited
number of parameters mandated in the FAA proposed rule).
231 14 C.F.R. § 121 (codifying 62 Fed. Reg. 65202 (Dec. 11, 1997) (correcting
62 Fed. Reg. 38362 (July 17, 1997)).
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and make necessary modifications.2"2 This action indicates that




In the past, there have been few major aircraft accidents
caused by hazardous materials shipments. 23 Hazardous cargo
comprises only a small portion of the freight carried on U.S.
transports.23 4 Cargo specialists have noted that commercial air-
lines are doing a decent job of handling hazardous material
shipments; however, dangerous items shipped without declara-
tion continue to pose serious problems. 35
In May 1996, a Valujet DC-9 crashed in the Florida Ever-
glades, killing 110 people. On August 19, 1997, the NTSB deter-
mined that the accident resulted from a fire in the Class D cargo
compartment due to the actuation of one or more oxygen gen-
erators improperly carried as cargo. This improper carriage re-
sulted from SabreTech's failure to prepare, package, identify,
and track unexpended chemical oxygen generators properly
before presenting them to Valujet for carriage; 2 6 Valujet's fail-
ure to oversee its contract maintenance program properly to en-
sure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and
hazardous materials requirements and practices; and the FAA's
failure to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems
in Class D cargo compartments. 237 It was also determined that
the FAA failed to monitor adequately Valujet's heavy mainte-
nance program and responsibilities, including Valujet's over-
sight of its contractors and SabreTech's repair station certificate,
and that the FAA failed to respond adequately to prior chemical
oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential
hazards. 238 The fire was started by chemical oxygen generators
which were stored in a compartment of the plane without smoke
detectors or fire extinguishing systems. The generators sup-
232 See id.
233 See Paul Proctor, Undeclared Cargo Complicates Transport of Hazardous Materi-
als, AVIATION WK. AND SPACE TECI., May 27, 1996, at 31.
234 See id.
235 See id at 32.
236 SabreTech was under contract to provide maintenance service of the
aircraft.
237 See Hall, supra note 30.
238 See id.
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plied the oxygen needed for the fire. The NTSB is currently
reviewing two other incidents involving fires caused by chemical
oxygen generators carried on board commercial air
transports.239
The DOT initiates, sets, and administers the rules for trans-
portation of hazardous materials by U.S. airlines.240 The Depart-
ment's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
oversees the FAA's hazardous materials program, which includes
regulations regarding passenger and all-cargo aircraft, and re-
quirements for packaging, labeling, and personnel training. In
addition, the FAA has input on aviation-related hazardous
materials issues and can suggest or comment on the DOT's pro-
posed rule changes.
B. PROBLEMS
There are a number of aviation safety issues raised by the
transport of hazardous materials, most importantly the ship-
ment of dangerous items without declaration. As of 1996, there
were more than 500 annual reports of undeclared dangerous
materials.24' Whether unintentional or intentional, these ship-
ments are generally discovered only if they have been packaged
improperly. The crash of Valujet Flight 592 is an example of an
unintentional violation, in that the oxygen canisters on board
the aircraft were mislabeled as empty. Intentional violations are
often motivated by economic motives. Hazardous materials
surcharges are imposed by freight handlers and airlines because
the required training of employees in dangerous goods han-
dling can be CoStly. 24 3
To prevent the illegal transport of hazardous materials, there
is a need for more inspectors to enhance the FAA's ability to
detect violations. Even prior to the Valujet incident, the NTSB
pointed out the need for more U.S. Transportation inspectors
to spot check economically pressed small shippers, who are most
likely to ignore rules for hazardous goods. 24 4 The amount of
U.S. air cargo is expected to triple within the next 20 years, so a
239 See Edward H. Phillips, NTSB Urges Review of Hazardous Materials, AVIATION
WK. AND SPACE TECH., June 10, 1996, at 26.
240 See Interview with Robert Kelly, supra note 23.
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long-term approach for additional inspection services should be
implemented now. 245
There is also a need for improved education and training for
shippers and airline workers who handle hazardous materials.
The mechanics who prepared the oxygen-generating canisters
for shipping on the Valujet DC-9 did not have the correct caps
to seal the canisters' activating mechanisms.246 Instead, they im-
provised a rigging that they believed would disable the canisters;
however, post-crash tests have convinced investigators that the
makeshift rigging did not work.247
Finally, there is a need to keep incendiary chemicals and sub-
stances out of airplane compartments without fire suppression
capabilities 248 or, at least, to insure that such compartments are
equipped with early smoke and fire detection devices. 249 Until
recently, Class D cargo compartments, which seal in order to cut
off the flow of oxygen if a fire breaks out, were not required to
be equipped with smoke detectors or fire extinguishing
systems.25 °
C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
As a result of the Valujet fire and crash, the RSPA placed a
temporary ban on the carriage of chemical oxygen generators
until January 1997. In June 1996, the NTSB urged the FAA to:
(1) immediately re-evaluate training and handling procedures
in effect at all U.S. air carriers pertaining to the identification of
unauthorized hazardous materials offered for transport; (2) re-
vise training practices to ensure that airline personnel can iden-
245 See FAA Earmarks $14 Million to Improve Transport of Hazmat, AIR CARGO REP.,
July 18, 1996.
246 See Ken Kaye, The Crash of Valujet Flight 592; Path to Disaster, SUN-SENTINEL,
Aug. 11, 1996, at 1A.
247 See id.
248 See Gary Stoller, Dangerous Cargo, Passengers in Peril, USA TODAY, Apr. 27,
1998, at 1B (stating that two years after the Valujet crash, a USA Today investiga-
tion found potentially lethal hazardous materials continue to be improperly
shipped, packed, and handled on America's airlines).
249 See Hall, supra note 30 (stating that the ability of the crew aboard Federal
Express DC-10, which, on a September 5, 1996, flight from Memphis to Boston,
reported smoke in the cockpit and diverted to land at Stewart International Air-
port to escape without injury before the airplane was destroyed by fire, was an
illustration of the value of early smoke and fire detection where the aircraft was
equipped with 12 smoke detectors, and the first indication of a problem was the
illumination of lights for detectors 7, 8, and 9).
250 See Randolph E. Schmid, Regulators to Ban More Hazardous Materials Aboard
Airliners, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 16, 1996.
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tify unauthorized or hazardous materials; (3) prohibit carriage
of chemical oxygen generators as cargo on board any passenger
or cargo aircraft when their shelf life has expired and the chemi-
cal core has not been depleted; and (4) prohibit the transport
of oxidizers and oxidizing materials in cargo compartments
lacking fire or smoke detection systems.
In July of 1996, following the NTSB's recommendations, the
FAA proposed the following: (1) the RSPA should permanently
ban the transportation of oxidizers and oxidizing materials in
specific compartments of passenger and cargo planes; (2) more
hazardous materials should be added to the list of those already
restricted for shipment on airlines; (3) the number of hazard-
ous materials inspectors should be increased from 22 to 150; (4)
there should be required labeling of Class C and D cargo com-
partments to enable easy identification by ground crews (Class C
compartments contain smoke and fire detectors; Class D com-
partments do not); and (5) there should be improved education
for shippers and airline workers who work with hazardous
materials.
D. COMMENTS/CONCLUSIONS
The FAA reacted quickly to the Valujet accident, but its initial
response did not necessarily alleviate concerns. Some con-
tended that the primary flaw in the FAA regulations was that
they did not require improved fire suppression equipment.
Since 1986, the FAA has required more stringent burn-through
tests for Class D cargo compartment liners, but has only recently
complied with NTSB pleas to require fire detection systems. 25 1
The FAA concluded that fire/smoke detection would not pro-
vide a significant degree of protection to occupants of aircraft
and, as such, terminated rule-making on that issue. 252
Recently, however, the FAA ordered fire detection and sup-
pression systems for aircraft cargo compartments. 253 This rule
meets a recommendation of the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security, which urged the installation of
both fire detection and suppression system cargo holds. 254
251 See Phillips, supra note 239.
252 See id.
253 See The Federal Aviation Administration, Official Internet Site, FAA Orders
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The regulations will restrict hazardous materials carried on
planes and require fire detection and suppression systems; thus,
the FAA's approach is now geared toward prevention and sup-
pression. However, restricting hazardous materials does not
guarantee compliance, and illegal materials may continue to
find their way on board. Even under such regulations, the
Valujet crash might not have been preventable. If the accident
was partly due to mislabeling the oxygen canisters as empty, they
would not have been banned for containing hazardous chemi-
cals. However, inspection of the improvised rigging caps could
have revealed the mislabeling and avoided the tragedy. Thus,
the FAA's recent action in requiring fire detection and suppres-
sion indicates that the FAA believes that such additional action
is necessary to ensure that, in the event materials are carried on
an aircraft illegally, airlines will be prepared to deal with the
possible consequences.
X. THE VALUJET MICROCOSM
The Valujet disaster, while bringing to light the dangers of
hazardous substance transportation, can also be viewed as a mi-
crocosm for two other important issues currently concerning
the FAA which also affect aviation safety: political volatility and
the dual role conflict.
A. THE FAA's POLITICAL VOLATILITY
Former FAA Administrator David Hinson's initial report to
Transportation Committee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-Pa.) on
June 11, 1996, indicated that Valujet was safe enough to fly. 255
However, one week later, immediately after a White House
meeting on the subject, the FAA promptly reversed its position
and grounded the airline.256 Reports circulated that the deci-
sion to ground the airline resulted from political pressure from
the White House. 257 Hinson denied this charge, asserting that
politics played no part in the decision, and stating that, " [i] n my
three-year tenure as FAA Administrator, the White House has
255 See David Hinson, former FAA Administrator, Report to Transportation Com-
mittee Chairman Bud Shuster (June 11, 1996). See also House Valujet Hearing Focuses
On FAA Oversight Performance, AVIATION DAiLY, June 26, 1996, at 511 [hereinafter
House Valuejet Hearing].
256 See id.
257 See id. (quoting Chairman Shuster as stating, "We have no proof, but a ra-
tional person could conclude that political considerations played a role.").
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never in any way asked or tried to direct, has never tempered or
affected any of my decisions regarding safety issues. 258
In the Valujet situation, any political pressure would have had
the effect of making the skies safer. However, a branch of the
government or its members might seek to compel the FAA to
give the green light to an airline that the FAA had determined
to ground. Would the agency improperly defer to the White
House? Safeguards must be put in place to prevent political
pressure from influencing an independent government agency,
such as the FAA. Perhaps the House of Representatives should
regularly review the timing of certain FAA decisions, as it did in
the wake of the ValuJet disaster, to determine if political pres-
sure played any part in safety-related FAA decisions.
B. THE DuAL ROLE CONFLICT
The events leading up to the grounding of Valujet in the mid-
dle of June, 1996, seem to demonstrate a conflict that may have
plagued the FAA since its inception. Valujet began service in
October of 1993, and since that time the FAA mounted 21 sepa-
rate investigations of the airline.259 Investigators discovered that
Valujet planes were flying with their mandatory equipment bro-
ken.2 16 The agency cited Valujet pilots for routinely making bad
cockpit decisions.261 Ironically, by March of 1996, even the air-
line's internal reports revealed a litany of problems.262 Among
these were eight engine shutdowns during flights, thirteen forced
returns to airports, and twenty eight problems with landing
gear.2
63
Despite the FAA's admitted awareness of these problems, the
airline was allowed to continue flying.2 64 Naturally, some won-
der why the FAA, an agency that is supposed to protect passen-
gers from dangerous airlines, would allow Valujet to keep
flying.265 The answer may have lain in the FAA's previous char-
258 Hinson, supra note 255.
259 See Freeland, supra note 113.




264 See Discount Airline, FAA Roles Differ But Passenger Safety Concerns Both, SUN
SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 1996, at 18A [hereinafter Discount Airline] (discussing the fact
that even after the May 11, 1996, crash of a Valujet DC-9, the FAA insisted that
Valujet was safe to fly).
265 SeeJohn Ritter, Redrawing Safety Course: Some Argue Politics Blurs Mission; Lat-
est Crash Highlights FAA's Conflicting Role, USA TODAY, May 20, 1996, at lB (quot-
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ter: the agency's mandate was to regulate, as well as promote,
the airline industry.266 There lay the potential conflict which
may have plagued the FAA since its inception in 1958.267 The
same agency that was charged with policing the industry was also
to act as its principal public advocate.268 Until the middle of
May 1996, for instance, the FAA was using Valujet as its deregu-
lation poster child, touting it as an inspiration to the industry
with its rapid growth and cheaper fares.269 After all, Valujet's
cut-rate pricing was functioning just the way advocates of dereg-
ulation had promised-the aviation business was being "freed
up" and the bigger airlines would be forced to follow suit by
reducing their fares and making air travel accessible to
everyone. 7 °
The dual role conflict had also manifested itself outside the
problem of discount airlines like Valujet. For example, many
critics have maintained that the FAA's downplaying of the bogus
parts problem was a result of the FAA's close relationship with
ing Vernon Grose, former member of the NTSB as stating; "[t]he public wants
the agency to be a safety watchdog, but the public is paying for something it's not
getting."); Willy Stern, Bogus Parts Have Turned Up In Commercial Jets. Where's the
FAA?, BuSINESS WK., June 10, 1996, at 84 (quoting an injured Valujet passenger
who escaped a burning plane in Atlanta as stating, "[a]ren't they supposed to
make sure these planes are safe?").
266 See Feaver, supra note 111 (the FAA's charter states that it is to "provide for
the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in such a manner as to best foster
its development and safety.") Id.
267 See Ritter, supra note 265.
26 SeeJ. Lynn Lunsford, FAA Rejected 532 Proposals For Air Safety; Agency Says It
Has Given Most of NTSB's Ideas Close Attention, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 30,
1996, at IA (quoting a director for the National Association of Flight Attendants
as stating, "[o]ften, the FAA has put promoting air commerce ahead of air
safety.").
269 See Freeland, supra note 113; see also Elizabeth Gleik, Does Air Safety Have a
Price?; Human Error May Have Caused the Crash, But the FAA May Also Tolerate High
Risk for Low-Cost Airlines, TIME, May 27, 1996, at 40 (stating that after deregulation
161 airlines have gone out of business, but Valujet, with aggressive fares managed
to turn a profit in 1995 and was considered by the FAA as a credit to the
industry).
270 See Freeland, supra note 113. Despite the FAA's praise for Valujet, the real-
ity was that the airline was unsafe to fly. These dangers have been adequately
described above. See supra notes 113-117, 259-263 and accompanying text. It
should also be noted, moreover, that discount airlines are considered by some
US officials to be twice as likely as major airlines to have an accident. Id. Budget
airlines usually buy older planes to keep initial costs low. See also Gleick, supra
note 269. These planes, in turn, require additional maintenance, but discount
airlines subcontract out their repair work, which may compromise safety. Id.
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the airlines.271 Similarly, other critics have stated that the FAA
failed to ground 737s, even in light of the problems with them,
because of the FAA's deference to Boeing, a long time industry
powerhouse and manufacturer of the 737.272 Former Depart-
ment of Transportation Secretary Frederico PeZa recently urged
Congress to change the FAA's charter in order to make safety its
primary aim.273 Mr. PeZa claimed that the dual mandate "has
caused some to believe that the FAA had to make choices be-
tween safety and promoting the industry. 2 74
Recently, however, the FAA's charter has been revised to
make safety the FAA's primary goal. 275 Thus, it is clear that the
industry is focused on putting safety in the forefront. Nonethe-
less, the dual role conflict may continue to be a problem that
needs to be addressed in order to improve air safety because the
possible conflict permeates every major safety-related decision
that the FAA makes-whether it be related to bogus parts, 737s,
or discount airlines. The easiest and most obvious way to com-
bat the conflict is to eradicate it. Airline Pilot Association Presi-
dent J. Randolph Babbitt commented that the change is "long
overdue and is a major step in the right direction."276 Not sur-
prisingly, the only industry-related groups who did not call for
elimination of the dual role mandate were those representing
the airlines who, like the Air Transport Association, claimed that
the FAA's then-current mandate was clear: "[f]rom the indus-
try's point of view, the agency has focused first and foremost on
safety and has never let its secondary mission of promoting avia-
tion get in the way of its primary objective." 277
Above all else, the federal government should ensure that the
public gets the safety it should be getting. The public, in gen-
eral, believes that the FAA is strictly a safety regulator, and the
27, Burnett, supra note 34; See also Stern, supra note 265 (quoting an FAA na-
tional branch agent as stating, "[t]he FAA worships at the altar of industry
groups. It's a simple matter of economics. The airlines can't afford to clean up
the problem, so the FAA lets the bad parts fly").
272 Acohido, supra note 219.
273 See Frederico PeZa, Remarks before Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation Concerning Oversight of Aviation Safety (July 17, 1996,
transcript available at 1996 WL 410108 (F.D.C.H.)).
274 See id.
275 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101(d)(1) (1998); see also Telephone Interview with
Arlene Feldman, FAA Regional Administrator (Mar. 24, 1998).
276 ALPA Reaction to FAA Changes, PR NEWSWipIE, June 18, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories.
277 Id.
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way in which the FAA has handled crises like Valujet only serves
to undermine public confidence in the agency.278 The best way
to promote air travel to the public is through a guarantee of air
safety. 279 Thus, a change in the FAA's charter is a positive first
step in focusing the agency's mission on safety. However,
whether this will have a practical effect remains to be seen.
In 1974, the long-since abolished Atomic Energy Commission,
which promoted and developed nuclear reactors, as well as reg-
ulated their safety, was split into the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE).28°
Today, the NRC regulates the use of radioactive material and
the DOE consolidates government energy programs.28' It may
be time for the same to be done in the aviation industry.
XI. TERRORISM
A. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism poses a threat to many aspects of life today, and air
travel is no exception. Commercial aviation has historically
been a favorite target of terrorists. In the early 1970s, more than
30% of all international terrorist attacks were targeted against
some aspect of commercial aviation. 28 2 Since 1969, one-third of
the seventy known bombing attempts against airlines worldwide
have achieved some degree of success, 283 resulting in at least fif-
teen crashes and killing 1732 people.284
The face of terrorism, as it relates to air travel, has changed
over the past two decades. The trend has moved away from air-
line hijackings and attacks on specific officials toward large-
scale, indiscriminate violence and killings.285 Portable missiles
represent an entirely new category of threats, in the face of
278 See Pressler Questions FAA's Record Acting On, Disclosing ValuJet Safety Inforna-
tion, AVIATION DAILY, June 19, 1996 (quoting Senate Commerce Committee
Chairman Larry Pressler (R- S.D.) as stating, "[t] he way FAA has handled release
of Valujet safety-related reports to Congress and the public continues to under-
mine confidence in the agency").
279 Discount Airline, supra note 264.
280 See Poole, supra note 119.
281 See Ritter, supra note 265.
282 See Brian M. Jenkins, Flight 800's Legacy Trying to Stop Sabotage, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 15, 1996, at G-1.
283 See Robin Wright and Richard T. Cooper, U.S. Flights Vulnerable to Lagging
Security, L. A. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at 1.
284 SeeJenkins, supra note 282.
285 See Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 19, 1996.
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which, commercial aircraft are virtually defenseless.286 Intelli-
gence experts have warned that anti-American terrorism is grow-
ing, resulting in the threat of domestic terrorism against U.S.
airlines becoming more real. 7
B. PROBLEMS
There is a perception that the United States has failed to
adopt a coherent and effective policy to combat the growing
problem of terrorism as it relates to commercial aviation.288 In
recent years, U.S. security measures have remained reminiscent
of the past, in that the toughest measures were focused not on
terrorist bombs on planes, but rather on potential hijackers and
drug trafficking.2 9 As a result, the methods used to protect
American planes from bombs lag behind both the state of the
art and the systems already deployed in many European coun-
tries. Furthermore, the sophisticated technology available to
terrorists far surpasses security systems employed at many U.S.
airports z.2 10 Senior U.S. counter-terrorism officials have noted
that placing a bomb on a U.S. airliner is easier than smuggling
either a gun or a knife on board.29 '
As a starting point, two areas are clearly in need of improve-
ment. First, there is the need for expert technological devices to
detect weapons and bombs that are not detected by mechanisms
currently in use in most American airports (e.g., metal detectors
and x-ray machines).292 In addition, airline security personnel
represent a weak link in the chain of security. 293 Many of the
systems in operation today are manual and depend on an opera-
tor's judgment, training, and experience to ensure optimum
results.
294
The identification of potential areas of improvement is only
one part of the solution. There has also been much debate re-
garding the cost of improving existing security systems. There is
286 See Wright and Cooper, supra note 283.
287 See Edward H. Phillips, House Panel Focuses on Counter-Terrorism Methods, AViA-
TION WK. AND SPACE TECH., Sept. 16, 1996, at 38.
288 See, e.g., Shirlyce Manning, The United States' Response to International Air
Safety, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 505 (Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996).
289 See id.
290 See Wright and Cooper, supra note 283.
291 See id.
292 See Vice President Al Gore, supra note 69.
293 See id.; see a/soJames Ott, Security Rates 'Top Priority,' AviATION WK. AND SPACE
TECH., Sept. 16, 1996, at 36. [hereinafter Ott]
294 Id.
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concern about the cost-efficiency of potential improvements,
about who will actually pay for any improvements made, and
about delays and inconveniences to passengers resulting from
more elaborate security systems. Although, over the past dec-
ade, there have been many proposals to improve terrorism pre-
vention tactics, their implementation has frequently been
thwarted by the controversy over costs. Government officials be-
lieve that the airline industry, which has typically paid for its own
security, has resisted many of the demands for improvement
due to financial concerns.295 On the other hand, the airlines,
engaged in fierce competition, argue that past proposals have
been unrealistic, and that they cannot be implemented without
crippling the travel system with costly and frustrating delays.296
Edward Merlis, senior vice president for government affairs of
the Air Transport Association, has commented that there is a
considerable difference between processing passengers and in-
terdicting terrorists, and that the latter goes beyond the indus-
try's responsibilities.29 7
Another perceived problem relating to terrorism and airline
safety is the prior dual role of the Federal Aviation Agency and
its continuing effect. The FAA, until recently, was responsible
both for promoting safe air travel and enforcing security meas-
ures affecting aircraft and air terminals. Recently, however, the
FAA's role was changed, making aviation safety its top priority.
The FAA's security department is the regulatory arm of the gov-
ernment's counter-terrorist program. Since its inception, the
department has focused on identifying security threats involving
aircraft piracy, prescribing security requirements for airlines,
aircraft, and airports, and providing technical assistance regard-
ing these measures. 298 At the same time, its prior role as pro-
moter of aviation may have mitigated the FAA's security
enhancement demands, the continuing effects of which remain
to be seen.299
Even with all the recent emphasis placed on the threat of ter-
rorism, there remain some who believe that, in the end, the risk
does not justify the cost of preventative measures. One com-
mentator noted that for those travelling by plane during the six
295 See Mineta, supra note 74; see also Christopher Drew, The Fate of Flight 800:
Safety Stalled, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See Manning, supra note 288.
2-99 See id.; see also Drew, supra note 295.
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billion air trips worldwide in the past eight years, the chances of
dying in an incident involving an on-board bomb was less than 1
in 8 million. 30 0 Another commentator examined the cost of ad-
ditional time necessary for the expanded pre-boarding process-
ing of passengers. Estimating the extra time spent at one-half
hour, and using a rate of $10 per 1/2 hour per passenger, multi-
plied by 500 million passengers, the total cost would be $5 bil-
lion per year. Since 1982, an estimated 548 people have died in
air crashes in the United States linked to sabotage, or 37 lives
per year. This would result in a $135 million cost for each life
saved per year, assuming new airport precautions actually cut
sabotage deaths to zero."" Finally, an economist at Harvard has
estimated that saving one life would cost approximately $50 mil-
lion, and that doing so at this price would be self defeating be-
cause it would drain resources from other life-saving
purposes. 3112 This type of cost-benefit analysis is difficult, how-
ever, because the value of human lives cannot readily be trans-
lated into dollars. In addition, this perspective does not take
into account the sharp political costs of terrorism and the at-
tending public perceptions of government inaction.""
C. EARLY U.S. RESPONSES
In the wake of the 1988 bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, the FAA announced sweeping proposals to
fight terrorism and revamp security measures. 0 4 The agency in-
creased security requirements for searching and tracing baggage
on overseas flights, proposed large fines against twenty-six air-
lines for failure to detect test objects and proposed a rule that
required bomb-detection equipment at airports." 5
The White House Commission on Aviation Security and Ter-
rorism was formed by executive order in August 1989 in re-
sponse to the bombing. The Commission endorsed many of the
proposals that had been made by the FAA, and released its own
300 See Stephen Chapman, Intrusive Airport Security Gives Terrorists a Victory, POST
AND COURIER, Sept. 13, 1996, at 19.
301 See Peter Passell, Economic Scene: In Airline Safety, 7oo Much Vigilance Can Be a
Bad Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at D2.
30W See Peter Passell, Air-Safety Cost: What's a Life Worth?, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 7, 1996.
303 See Steven Erlanger, Much Ado on Terrorism; How Grave, Really, Is the Threat?,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 2, 1996.
304 See Drew, supra note 295.
305 See id.
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report in May 1990, concluding that the air-security system was
"seriously flawed," and calling for sweeping reform.30 6 Among
the recommendations the commission made were: (1) to use
U.S. military forces against air terrorists; (2) to adopt foreign
policies to isolate state sponsors of terrorism; (3) to notify all
passengers in cases of credible bomb threats; (4) to cancel the
FAA's order to install $175 million worth of plastic-explosive de-
tection devices (because such devices would probably not have
detected the bomb that blew up Flight 103); (5) to create a
high-level federal coordinator to oversee air security and intelli-
gence; and (6) to update screening, training and testing of
ground security crews, including criminal background checks of
all airport workers. In November 1990, President Bush signed
the Aviation Security Improvement Act, which mandated many
of the improvements suggested by the Commission.
Unfortunately, many of these proposals never fully developed.
The plan to require installation of millions of dollars worth of
new bomb-detection machines at various airports generated de-
bate over how well a bomb-detection machine must work before
it is worth deploying. 3 v A somewhat "all-or-nothing" mindset, as
well as concerns over whether the technology worked well
enough to justify its expense, ultimately caused the plan to
founder.
The plan to require criminal background checks on many air-
line workers met with great resistance. Critics argued that there
had never been a case of an employee with a criminal record
joining in a terrorist plot, and that the proposal was thus a waste
of money.3 0 The FAA was finally able to adopt a diluted version
of the rule in 1995.309 This version provided that those already
working for the airlines were exempted from the fingerprint
checks, carriers were required to ask forjob histories of new em-
ployees with access to restricted areas, and airlines were given
the authority to seek checks of FBI fingerprint records as the
need arose:
A plan to impose heavy fines on airlines for failure to detect
undercover test objects sent through baggage checks also gener-
ated negative feedback from the airlines. The FAA ultimately




- See Mineta, supra note 74.
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limited use of fines to only the most blatant cases where airport
screeners failed to detect guns and bomb parts."'
D. RESPONSES UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Even before the explosion of TWA Flight 800, a "broad con-
sensus had developed in the government and aviation industry
that terrorism posed a greater threat to air travel than ever
before. '3 12 While the cause of the explosion remains uncertain,
the initial reaction to this event thrust the issue of terrorism and
airline safety back into the public spotlight and prompted rapid
government reaction.
Soon after the TWA explosion, President Clinton asked Vice
President Gore to chair the Aviation Safety and Security Com-
mission. On September 9, 1996, the Commission made the fol-
lowing recommendations: (1) use automated profiling of all
airline passengers based on information already available in
computer data bases; (2) develop better ways to profile travelers
so as to spot terrorists; (3) purchase sophisticated bomb detec-
tion devices; (4) train and deploy 115 new bomb-sniffing dogs
and handler teams; (5) screen, train, certify and test airport se-
curity personnel; (6) match every bag loaded onto a plane with
a passenger; (7) perform criminal background and fingerprint
checks of airline and airport employees; and (8) expand the
role of U.S. Customs Service, FBI, CIA and other agencies in
detecting terrorists. 13
Following the release of the Commission's report, President
Clinton proposed $1.1 billion in new spending to tighten airline
security and fight terrorism.3 14 This proposal tied together sev-
eral long-standing anti-terror initiatives as well as the recommen-
dations of the Commission. $ 429 million dollars is slated for
the aviation security measures urged by the Commission, and $
667 million is slated for anti-terrorism spending at a variety of
federal agencies.3 5
The Clinton Administration also announced that the federal
government will for the first time assume much of the cost and
311 See id.
312 Roberto Suro, Bomb Detection System Remains on the Drawing Board and Out of
Airports, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996, at A12.
313 See Vice President Al Gore, supra note 69.
314 See id.
315 See John M. Broder, President Targets Air Terrorism; Seeks $1 Billion for Fight,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at 14.
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responsibility for airline security.3 16 This is consistent with the
growing sentiment that terrorism is a national security problem,
not merely an air safety issue. As Vice President Gore remarked,
" [t] errorist actions against Americans on U.S. airliners represent
an attack against the United States... there is clearly a national
interest involved in combating this threat. '317 However, airlines
will remain responsible for some expenses, such as the costs as-
sociated with the proposed passenger-baggage match
program. 8
E. COMMENTS/CONCLUSIONS
The steps the federal government has taken toward improving
the safety of air travel seem at first glance comprehensive and
promising. However, similar initiatives have been suggested
before and have failed. Politics often impede the transition of
proposals into reality, but there may also be good reasons why
some past initiatives have not gotten very far. Today's proposals
must be closely examined to determine whether they are sound
as well as realistic.
One of the proposals calls for the purchase of sophisticated
bomb detection devices, such as computer tomography detec-
tion systems (CTX-5000s) and vapor trace particle detectors. As
before, this plan raises questions concerning both the cost and
success rate of these technologies. A foolproof or "complete de-
tection" system simply does not exist. The FAA has certified an
explosives-detection machine, the CTX-5000, which costs ap-
proximately $1 million.3" 9 In tests, it has sounded false alarms
about 30% of the time, and it only processes 100 to 125 bags per
hour (compared to the 450 bags per hour the airlines say is nec-
essary to avoid delaying flights) .32° Because the systems cur-
rently in place are fairly inefficient, some think it is better to use
the most effective approaches currently available, which will
probably increase the chances of intercepting explosives. Most
recently, however, the DOT and the FAA purchased "some 79
certified explosives detection systems and advanced technolo-
gies for screening of checked bags," with deployment to be com-
316 See Ott, supra note 293.
317 Roberto Suro, U.S. Government to Assume Primary Responsibility for Airport Se-
curity, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at A3.
318 See id.
319 See Roberto Suro, Bomb Detection System Remains on the Drawing Board and Out
of Airports, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996, at A12.
320 See id.
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pleted in 1998.321 "In addition, over 50 trace explosives
detection devices were deployed in 1997," increasing the total
from 78 to 128.322 "About 365 more trace detection devices will
be purchased and installed by the end of 1998."323
Another key component of the government's plan is passen-
ger profiling. Profiling entails asking passengers specific ques-
tions in order to identify those travelers who pose the highest
security risks. Airlines also use information they already have
about travelers, such as frequent flier miles, to pre-screen pas-
sengers. The anti-terrorist profiling will build on a system al-
ready in use by the Customs Service for targeting potential drug
couriers flying into the U.S.3 24 Although profiling can be an ef-
fective way to screen for terrorism, it raises issues of violations of
civil rights and privacy. The American Civil Liberties Union has
already expressed concern about profiling, pointing out that use
of profiles is not a sufficient basis for targeting passengers for
extra scrutiny and will often involve the use of racial or ethnic
stereotypes. 5 However, the Supreme Court has previously ap-
proved the use of profiling for drug searches at airports,3 26 and
could potentially endorse its use to combat terrorism in an ap-
propriate case.
Moreover, Attorney General Janet Reno recently announced
in a report to the Department of Transportation that the FAA-
proposed Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System
(CAPS) does not violate U.S. passengers' civil liberties.327 CAPS
is designed to establish a more controlled screening system in
which possible human bias or airline employees' misapplication
of selection criteria are eliminated. 8 CAPS was prototyped,
tested with Northwest Airlines in 1997, and is being phased in by
U.S. airlines in 1998.329 The FAA tested passenger bag matching
in 1997 and, on January 1, 1998, augmented the bag-matching
321 WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY, THE DOT




324 See Richard Sisk, Experts Give Thumbs Down to Anti-Terrorism Plan, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1996, at A20.
,125 See id.
3 '2 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983).
327 See Justice Department Says Proposed Passenger Profiling System Non-Discrimina-
tory, AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 20, 1997.
328 See id.
329 See White House Commission on Aviation Safety, supra note 299.
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program in conjunction with both manual screening and
CAPS. 330
The directive involving matching luggage with passengers on
every domestic flight is intended to prevent a person from
checking a bag and then not boarding the plane. However, air-
line professionals state that they have no idea how to carry out
this plan, and have been given little guidance.3 3 1 There are over
8 million airline departures annually from U.S. airports, involv-
ing more than 1 billion bags,332 posing a huge logistical problem
in terms of magnitude and space. Airports will need more room
to hold large numbers of people for extended periods of time,
as well as room in which to carry out the bag match. In addi-
tion, the current passenger-bag match in use for U.S. interna-
tional flights does not always work well, 333 raising concerns
about its successful use in domestic services as well. However,
on February 12, 1997, the DOT issued a final rule to improve
passenger manifests by requiring more information on passen-
ger manifests for flights to or from the United States.334
The requirement for fingerprinting and background checks
for airline personnel raises concerns similar to those made after
the Lockerbie explosion. An Air Transportation Association of-
ficial commented that the requirement looks like an intrusion
with no enforcement payoffs because none of those persons
charged or convicted of a terrorist act in recent years has had a
criminal record. 35 In addition, it takes two to three months for
police responses on background checks, a considerable lag
time.336 Moreover, criminal background checks on airport per-
sonnel are prohibited unless there is an unexplained period of
unemployment within the prior ten years. 37 Thus, these re-
quirements may have no beneficial impact at all.
330 See id.
331 See Robert A. Rankin, Airlines to Match Fliers, Luggage; Clinton Orders Anti-
Terror Effort, THE RECORD, Sept. 10, 1996, at Al.
332 See Ott, supra note 293.
333 See id.
334 See White House Commission on Aviation Safety, supra note 321.
335 See id.
336 See id.
337 See Interview with Robert Kelly, supra note 23.
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XII. TWA FLIGHT 800
On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded over the Atlantic
Ocean shortly after taking off from Kennedy Airport. 38 The
tragic loss of 230 persons on that flight stunned the world. It
also prompted the largest transportation accident investigation
in American, and perhaps world, history, led by the NTSB.339
After nearly two years of the most extensive investigation in the
history of aviation, the NTSB has not yet identified the probable
cause of this accident. However, what has emerged is a focus on
the explosive characteristics and the potential sources of igni-
tion of the fuel/air vapors, which led to an explosion in the
nearly empty center wing fuel tank,340 as well as the expansion of
the FAA's aging aircraft program to include such non-structural
aircraft components as electrical wiring.
3 4
'
A. EXPLOSIVE FUEL/AIR MIXTURES AND POTENTIAL IGNITION
SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS
There have been some 25 fuel air explosions on aircraft since
1959.342 Much still needs to be learned about the explosive
characteristics of Jet A fuel, the elements required to ignite the
vapors associated with fuels, the temperature and vibrational
characteristics associated with airplane fuel tanks, and the vapor
concentrations in the tanks.343 In this regard, the NTSB has
been conducting the following tests in laboratories all around
the world: 1) laboratory studies of Jet A fuel; 2) flight tests on
Boeing 747/100 aircraft; 3) chemical characterization of Jet A
vapor; 4) Bruntingthorpe B-747/100 explosion tests; 5) quarter
scale explosion testing; and 6) computer modeling.344 NTSB In-
vestigator Dan Bower recently stated in connection with the
TWA Flight 800 investigation, "we saw a lot of warm tempera-
338 SeeJim Hall, Remarks before the Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure Regarding Accident Involving TWA Flight 800
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tures in the components, which raises the question: how do we
keep those warm temperatures from reaching the tank?
345
In addition, the NTSB has generally six primary ignition sce-
narios or theories currently being pursued as to the cause of the
accident: 1) center tank scavenge pump; 2) static electricity; 3)
fuel quantity indicating system; 4) No. 3 fuel tank electrical con-
duit; 5) small explosive charge; and 6) high speed particle pene-
tration-all of which are still being investigated. 46
As a result, the NTSB has made four recommendations to the
FAA which urge both short-term and long term actions to re-
duce the potential for a fuel/air vapor explosion in the center
fuel tanks of Boeing 747s, as well as in fuel tanks of other air-
craft. 47 The NTSB suggested possible means to reduce the ex-
plosive potential of the fuel vapor, "such as adding cold fuel to
the center tank before takeoff, providing insulation or other
methods to reduce the transfer of heat from the air condition-
ing units beneath the center tank, or inerting the tank by replac-
ing the explosive vapor with a harmless gas. '348 Although the
aviation industry has not completely embraced these recommen-
dations, the industry plans to undertake a survey of aircraft or
major fuel tank inspection programs to verify the integrity of
wiring and grounding straps; the conditions of fuel pumps, fuel
lines and fittings; and the electrical bonding on all equipment
including 747s, Airbuses and aircraft of other manufacturers.3 4
9
To date, a few of the most noteworthy FAA's actions in re-
sponse to the recommendations issued by the NTSB are in
eleven areas. 35 ° First, the FAA has completed work with Boeing
"on a service bulletin that will provide instructions for inspec-
tion of fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) wiring inside Boe-
ing 747 fuel tanks."'3 ' 1 This work has resulted in the issuance of
an Airworthiness Directive (AD) by the FAA that requires the
inspections. 52
345 Latest in Science and Technology News (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 13,
1997).




350 See Federal Aviation Administration, Statement on NTSB TWA 800 Recommen-
dations (Apr. 7, 1998) <http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/apr/apa4098.html>.
351 Id.
352 See 14 C.F.R. Pt. 39 (1999).
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Second, "It] he FAA has been working with Boeing on a ser-
vice bulletin that will provide instructions to replace Honeywell
series 1 th[r]ough series 3 terminal blocks with newer blocks
that have smooth surfaces and no sharp edges. '3 53 An AD fol-
lowing Boeing's service bulletin would incorporate such
instructions.354
Third, "[t] he FAA is preparing a Special Federal Aviation Reg-
ulation (SFAR) that would require manufacturers to develop an
FAA-approved fuel tank maintenance and inspection program
based on the TWA 800 investigation. 3 55 "It would also require
operators to have an FAA-approved fuel system maintenance
program. The SFAR also will require manufacturers to review
the original fuel system certifcation compliance findings and
revalidate that failures within the fuel system will not result in
ignition source. '356 "An evaluation of the need for electrical
transient suppression, or surge protection, will be a part of this
revalidation. 357
Fourth, "[t]he FAA supports a manufacturer-initiated inspec-
tion program to assess the in-service condition of fuel systems in
large transport airplanes. '358 Fifth, "[t]he FAA and NTSB con-
tinue to examine the effects of copper sulfur deposits on the
FQIS components in the fuel tank. '3 59 Sixth, "[t]he FAA issued
an NPRM AD on [December 1, 1997], to enhance the protec-
tion of the FQIS on Boeing 747s against transient electrical volt-
age spikes or short circuits. '31 60 "It requires installation of
components to suppress electrical transients and/or the installa-
tion of wire shielding and separation of FQIS wiring from other
aircraft wiring." 6 ' The actions specified by the NPRM are in-
tended to prevent electrical transients induced by electromag-
netic interference or electrical short circuit conditions from
causing arcing of the FQIS electrical wiring or probes in the fuel
tank, which could result in a source of ignition in the fuel
tank.3 6
2
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Seventh, the FAA issued an AD on December 1, 1997, to re-
quire disconnection of the electrical connector to the scavenge
pump of the center wing tank of certain Boeing Model 747 se-
ries airplanes. 6 This AD is prompted by findings from a design
review and analysis of scavenge pumps installed on certain Boe-
ing Model 747 series airplanes and is intended to prevent poten-
tial failures within the electrical motor assembly of the scavenge
pump, which could result in leakage of fuel from the electrical
connector into the main landing gear wheel well, or electrical
arcing within the scavenge pump motor. These conditions
could result in a fuel fire in the wheel well.3 64
Eighth, the FAA issued an AD on December 12, 1997, to re-
quire (i) repetitive inspections to detect damage of the sleeving
and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4
main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps; and
(ii) replacement of any damaged sleeving and wires. 6' This AD
is intended to detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving
and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the num-
bers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison
pumps, which could result in electrical arcing between the wires
and the aluminum conduit and consequent fire or explosion of
the fuel tank.166
Ninth, the FAA is continuing its review of different models of
Boeing aircraft to determine if wire separation and shielding is
needed. 67 Tenth, in January, 1997, the FAA directed the Avia-
tion Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to recommend
how to reduce or eliminate explosive fuel/air mixtures which
are potential ignition sources in fuel tanks.36 a
Eleventh, the FAA is investigating several ways to lessen the
risk of explosion, including foam, nitrogen insertion, and
venting.3 69
The FAA, as part of a continuing effort to address fuel tank
ignition sources, has issued a NPRM AD, applicable to operators
of Boeing 737 aircraft, intended to prevent possible ignition
363 62 Fed. Reg. 63622 (1997) (to be codified at 14 CFR Pt. 39).
364 Id.
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sources of fuel vapors in fuel tanks.17 0 The proposed AD seeks
to enhance the protection of the FQIS on Boeing 737 aircraft
against short circuits. 71 It would require installing transient
suppression components, and/or shielding and separation to
the fuel system wiring that is routed to the fuel tanks from adja-
cent wiring.3 72
Most recently, the FAA "ordered airlines to inspect 737 fuel
pump wires on planes with 30,000 to 40,000 flight hours within
45 days. '373 "The action- which also requires the addition of a
second layer of Teflon protection on the wires- was taken follow-
ing a detailed analysis of data obtained following the inspection
of at least 195 aircraft with 40,000 or more hours of service. 3 7
4
"There are 1,140 Boeing 737s registered in the United States
and 2772 worldwide.3 75 On May 7, 1998, "the FAA ordered a 7-
day inspection period for both the main and center pump wir-
ing on planes with 50,000 or more hours."376 On May 10, 1998,
"that order was amended to drop the inspection of the center
pump wires for the -100 and -200 series aircraft, require inspec-
tion of the main pump wiring before further flight, and to re-
quire the inspection of both sets of wires in the 40,000- to
50,000- hour category on the -300, -400 and -500 models.
3 77
For aircraft having flight and mechanical conditions closely
similar to those of TWA Flight 800, the aviation industry has an
obligation to the public to learn more about the characteristics
associated with Jet A fuel and its explosive tendencies, as well as
the aging of electrical wiring associated with fuel pumps and sys-
tems, in order to make flying as safe as technologically possible.
370 See 14 C.F.R. Pt. 39 (1999); see also Federal Aviation Administration, FAA
Orders Changes to Boeing 737 Fuel Quantity Indicating Systems (Apr. 16, 1998) (visited
Apr. 8, 1999) <http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/apr/apa4398.html> (setting forth
preventative measures following a similar Airworthiness Directive proposed by
FAA last November for Boeing 747-100, -200, and -300 series aircraft, which com-
ment period closed May 27, 1998).
371 See id.
372 See id.
373 Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Extends Boeing 737 Order, Directs Center
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B. AGING FLEET
Aircraft age is a serious problem. 78 The average age of com-
mercial airline fleets is continuing to increase.3 79 By the year
2000, more than 2500 commercial aircraft in the United States
may be flying beyond their original design lives. 8 ° In 1988, a
major incident in which the top peeled off an Aloha Airlines
Boeing 737 in flight, sweeping a flight attendant to her death,
was blamed on weak maintenance of the old aircraft's struc-
ture.381 In response, to help ensure the safety of aging jet
frames and exteriors, the FAA greatly expanded its structural in-
tegrity inspection program and formed the Airworthiness Assur-
ance Working Group (AAWG).382 As a result, some of the FAA's
most recent actions include the issuance of two ADs. The first
AD pertains to certain areas of the wing struts of certain Boeing
Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes.38 3 "This action
requires repetitive detailed visual and/or borescope inspections
to detect discrepancies of certain areas of the wing strut. 38 4
"The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and cor-
rect fatigue cracking and stress corrosion of the wing strut,
which could result in failure of the strut-to-wing interface, and
consequent separation of the engine and strut from the air-
plane. 385 The second AD "requires an internal visual inspec-
tion to detect cracks of the skin and internal doublers above
main entry door 1 at body station 460, [of certain Boeing Model
747 series airplanes,] and various follow-up actions. '' 38' This AD
was "prompted by reports indicating that multiple fatigue cracks
were found in both internal skin doublers" and is "intended to
detect and correct such fatigue cracking, which could result in
reduced structural integrity of the fuselage and consequent
rapid depressurization of the cabin."387 In addition, the FAA
has recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).
The NPRM "would require repetitive detailed visual inspections
for corrosion, and repetitive high frequency eddy current
378 See Hall, supra note 343.
379 See Vice President A] Gore, supra note 69.
380 See id.
381 See id., see alsoJeff Cole, Safety Board Grills Officials of Boeing At TWA Hearings,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1997, at B6.
382 Lunsford, supra note 268.
-3 63 Fed.Reg. 17932 (1998) (to be codified at 14 CFR Pt. 39).
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 63 Fed. Reg. 16098 (1998) (to be codified at 14 CFR Pt. 39).
387 Id.
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(HFEC) inspections for cracks, of the upper link assembly on
the number 2 and number 3 engine struts, and corrective ac-
tions, if necessary. '388 This NPRM was "prompted by reports of
corrosion and cracks located at the four fasteners that attach to
the aft end to the upper link assembly on the number 2 and
number 3 engine struts," and is "intended to prevent failure of
the upper link due to cracking or corrosion, subsequent damage
to other strut support structure, and in-flight separation of an
engine from the airplane. 3 89
However, little is known about the potential effects of age on
non-structural components of commercial aircraft.3 90  Non-
structural components include electrical wiring; connectors, wir-
ing harnesses, and cables; fuel, hydraulic and pneumatic lines;
and electro-mechanical systems such as pumps, sensors and ac-
tuators.3 "9 During the NTSB's hearings into the explosion of
TWA Flight 800, the Board questioned the failure of past reviews
of aging aircraft to address worn wiring and fuel systems. 92
Twenty-five years old, Flight 800 aircraft was past its age limit.3 93
Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, has previously stated
that frayed wiring seemed to be one of the likely causes of the
explosion of TWA Flight 800. The White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security is also concerned that existing
procedures, directives, quality assurance, and inspections may
not be sufficient to prevent safety related problems caused by
the corrosive and deteriorating effects of non-structural compo-
nents of commercial aircraft as they age.395 Thus, the Commis-
sion has recommended that the FAA work with airlines and
manufacturers to expand the aging aircraft program to include
non-structural components. Proposed plans include: full and
complete tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research program;
expansion of the FAA-DOD-NASA cooperative aging aircraft
program; expansion of programs of the AAWG to include non-
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structural components; and encouraging the development of
modern technical means to ensure and predict the continued
airworthiness of aging non-structural components and sys-
tems. 96 However, Mary Schiavo, the former Inspector General
of the DOT, indicated that inspectors cannot examine many
components of commercial aircraft-that planes were built for a
maximum safe lifespan of 20 years,3 97 and, thereafter, may en-
counter trouble. Further, by the year 2000, 40 percent of the
fleet is going to be over 20 years old. 98
XIII. CONCLUSION
This report has presented the major safety hazards plaguing
the aviation industry today. As stated at the outset, flying is sta-
tistically very safe but it could be even safer. Controlled Flight
Into Terrain, approaches to pilot training, language barriers be-
tween air traffic controllers and pilots, the need for moderniza-
tion of the air traffic control system, failure to detect
unapproved parts, the need for modernized flight data record-
ers, the dangers of transport of hazardous materials, the increas-
ing risk of terrorism, the existence of explosive fuel/air
mixtures and potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks, and
the use of aging aircraft pose continuing challenges to the avia-
tion industry's safety record. The current limitations in our avia-
tion safety system represent a tremendous potential cost, in
terms of both human lives and exposure to liability. Air travel is
too vital to global commerce, economic development, world
travel, and tourism to have its reputation and its future put at
risk.3
99
In 1995, then-FAA Administrator David Hinson challenged
the aviation industry to achieve "Zero Accidents. '40 0 The antici-
pated growth in aviation between now and the first quarter of
the next century may lead to the occurrence of aviation acci-
dents at a frequency that will be wholly unacceptable to the pub-
lic.40 1 Therefore, the industry can and must establish clear and
396 See id.
397 See Burnett, supra note 34.
398 See id.
3- SeeJane F. Garvey, Remarks at the International Air Safety Seminar (Nov. 4,
1997) (transcript available at <http://www.faa.gov/apa/speeches/
11497spjfg.htm>).
400 Federal Aviation Administration, About the Office of System Safety <http://nas-
dac.faa.gov/asy-internet/asyabout.htm>.
401 See Mineta, supra note 74.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
focused methods of achieving a zero accident rate. The present
FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, has stated that the FAA's mis-
sion is to reduce the accident rate. In order to accomplish this
mission, the FAA is adopting a two-pronged approach by (a) de-
veloping a focused safety agenda, and (b) by strengthening alli-
ances and partnerships with all segments of aviation.4 °2
Moreover, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security believes that improving levels of aviation safety, security
and modernization should be a national priority, resulting in a
re-definition of aviation safety and security for the rest of the
world.40 3 The American public deserves an absolute commit-
ment to achieving this goal.
COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICS
Shephard W. Melzer, Chair
Susan Sullivan Bisceglia, Secretary
Arthur Schiff, Treasurer
John D. Clemen Richard Hand Kessler
Jeanine C. Dore Douglas A. Latto
Thomas Allan Eff Michael C. Mulitz
Colm M. Glass Stephen G. Nordquist
C. Martin Goldenberg Albert J. Pucciarelli
Frank H. Granito III Steven C. Rickman
Alvin Green Anthony Michael Sabino
Alfred C. Jones Peter Safirstein
Alfred C. Jones III Ivars R. Slokenbergs
The Aeronautics Committee would like to thank the following individu-
als for their assistance in preparing this report:
Jonathan N. Santelli, Associate, Rogers & Wells;
J. Francis Cooke, Associate, Rogers & Wells;
Kimberly S. Loepp, Summer Associate, Rogers & Wells; and
Michelle Bowe, Former Associate, Rogers & Wells.
402 See White House Commission on Aviation Safety, supra note 321.
403 See id.
832
1999] REPORT ON AVIATION SAFETY COMMITTEE 833
The Aeronautics Committee expresses its appreciation to the following
individuals for their contributions in providing important information
for this report:
Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
Arlene Feldman, Regional Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration;
Ai Graser, Assistant Director of Airports, Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey;
Robert Kelley, Director of Airports, Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey;
Gary Kitley, Executive Director of the Council on Aviation Ac-
creditation; and
Joseph Montone, FAA Designated Examiner, and Part 121
Check Airmen and Instructor.
834 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [64
